

NOTES ON THE FORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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These background notes on how South African foreign policy is made (with special references to the United States) is the first account and evaluation of those institutions and individuals who contribute to its formation. It is not a study of policy *per se*. Rather, it provides insights and unpublished details on how South African society operates and on Afrikaner political orientations in the foreign policy realm.

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FORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN
FOREIGN POLICY

EDWIN S. MUNGER

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FOREWORD

IN THE sober opinion of some well-informed, influential, and responsible Americans, the United States and South Africa are drifting towards a state of hostilities. These men are convinced that hostility is not in the best interests of the people of either country, or of the Western World.

The question is not whether these Americans wholly or partially approve or disapprove of the way South Africa conducts her internal affairs or, conversely, whether South Africa likes or does not like the conduct of American foreign policy toward the continent of Africa.

The crucial issue is whether or not it is desirable to attempt to settle differences by force of arms, if indeed bloodshed would ameliorate rather than exacerbate long-term prospects of peace.

Whatever dice history may throw, they will be cast by human hands. There is nothing inevitable which means hostilities cannot be avoided or that violence can be precluded.

For a long time the general assumption of Americans has been that somehow, someday, total violence would erupt in South Africa. This has led to a *laissez faire* attitude. Comparably, South Africans often assume that efforts to be sympathetically understood and to find a *modus vivendi* must fail because the United States is too large and complex.

Our concern here is with the American approach to South Africa. The first shibboleth we would tackle is that of the historical inevitability of great violence in South Africa—

usually not stated in terms of a few thousand, or even tens of thousands of people murdered and killed, but as though a giant cataclysm were to involve hundreds of thousands and millions of lives. Virtually every year since 1922 there has been a profound prognostication that, in the next year, South Africa must explode like a volcano and that death and darkness will descend on it before a brighter day.

This view not only has a poor record of predictability, but it ignores the increasing tempo of tremendous changes which have taken place in the relationship between black and white. Three brief examples can encompass economic, social, and political change.

In 1958, the Communist Party-controlled Congress Alliance persuaded its primarily non-Communist African wing, the African National Congress, to call a general strike for higher wages. In order to appeal to the wildest dreams of the African "proletariat," the Communists and their African Nationalist allies made their slogan, "A Pound a Day." The sum of \$2.80 per day was then as now a wage with a much higher purchasing power in South Africa than in the United States. Yet it happens to be more than the writer received as a beginning reporter on *The Chicago Daily News* in 1938.

Although Bantu wages in South Africa were already the highest south of the Sahara, they fell short by at least one-half of answering the slogan: "Pound a Day or We Pound the Pavement!"

Yet in 1964, wages for semi-skilled or better urban Africans removed from the semi-barter economy of the tradi-

tional reserves, passed the figure of a Pound a Day demanded in that abortive 1958 strike. While there were thousands of unemployed workers or *tsotsis* (gangsters) to intimidate those Africans who wanted to work on strike day then, in 1965 there is full employment in such cities as Johannesburg, and also considerable labor bootlegging. Incomes of \$10,000 a year for businessmen are unusual, but you cannot count Africans who receive those incomes on the fingers of a dozen hands. A salary of \$280 a month for an African to manage a white farm in the Free State is not unique.

Since the year of the attempted strike, the average income of African families in the Johannesburg townships has risen 70%. In 1958 it was estimated that only 40% of Africans were above a poverty line but that by 1964 over 92% were above the minimum with prospects of this reaching 97% by early 1965. When slight increases in cost of living are figured realistically, wages have been rising over 4% annually since 1957.

In the last 16 years, the population has grown at a rate of 2.4%, but the Gross National Product has *averaged* (after adjustments for rising prices) an unusually high 6% per annum. It was 7.2% in 1962, almost a world-leading 7.5% in 1963, and appears to be over 7% (10.5 at current prices) for 1964. As Professor L. H. Samuels of Witwatersrand University has commented: "Even by historical standards the current South African economic boom is remarkable."

The percentage of Africans in highly skilled employment

(some legal and some "bootleg") is rising steadily, particularly in the defense industry. When the internal capital formation and the growth of a real money market are wedded to the tremendous natural resource base, the prospects of a rising standard of living for everyone are excellent.

Compared with salaries and the cost of living elsewhere in Africa, and throughout most of Asia and Latin America, the average urban African in the Republic is materially well off. His housing is better, he can buy more food, and he is more likely to drive a car (actually more than four times as many per head of population than the citizens of the Soviet Union). Man does not live by bread alone, but the revolutionary thrust on this economic level is gradually being met; what remains are tremendous demands for better homes, more cars, better suits and dresses, more and higher education (already the highest in literacy south of the Sahara), and a host of possessions that even the rising income of the African population will take a long time to achieve.

In the social sphere, it would scarcely have seemed possible in 1949, when the author first subscribed to Afrikaans papers, that *Die Transvaler*, traditionally the most *baas-kap* (boss-ship) of all Afrikaans papers, would now come to use Meneer (Mr.) in referring to an educated Bantu. This kind of breakthrough to human respect is far from complete, but it has taken only fifty years to attain this respect in South Africa, which still has large numbers of thoroughly tribal Bantu. Compare this with the hundred

years it took for some Southern newspapers to refer to educated and respectable Americans of African descent as Mr. and Mrs.

The willingness of South Africa to send its best athletes, regardless of color, to the 1964 Olympics was thrown back at the Republic for political reasons. But the success of the team of white and black boxers at the New York State Golden Gloves and of other South African teams, as well as the amount of informal sport across color lines, cannot be gainsaid even by those who would claim that South Africa is uniformly worse than segregated Mississippi.

Politically, the major breakthrough has been with the general concept of the Bantustans. This stems from the recognition, in the words of Defense Minister Fouché addressing Afrikaner students at Stellenbosch University, that "in the world today, one race cannot dominate another race."

As summed up by Editor M. T. Moerane of the *World*, a daily African newspaper in the Transvaal, the Transkei is getting somewhere: "The Transkei has nothing to lose from self government, and it stands to gain.

"The Transkei has already achieved one thing—a stable government with a determined cabinet and a challenging, powerful opposition. These are not amateurish clowns mimicking government. In debate, programme and responsibility, this Government compares favourably with any parliament—Cape Town and other African independent states included. I have seen many of these in action.

"What are the snags? The Transkei is a creation of the Nationalist Government and separate development. It is

dependent on the Republican Government for its policies and its finances and personnel.

"Chief Matanzima has accepted that fact. He says: We were colonized long ago. As long as the Transkei is dependent, he will play the game according to the rules of the government in power, speak their language, and with the maximum of co-operation, extract as much benefit for the Transkei as possible. Many people have called him a stooge but Matanzima's Government has been able to gain important concessions and advances.

"A Transkei development corporation with a capital of R1,000,000 has been formed, white private capital has been allowed into the Transkei for industrialization within, instead of on the borders, according to Bantustan policy. Bantu education is being reversed for universal education, with Cape European education as a guide. Matanzima is taking the Republic Government at their word. He realizes that his position of dependency is not ideal and he is set on a course to full independence soon."*

The author's own conversation with Prime Minister Matanzima long ago convinced him that, however imperfect the present economic and political arrangements, the way is open to a political resolution in South Africa.

Insofar as the large Coloured population is concerned, the exception is that they will merge with the white population. The present rate of reclassification from "Coloured" to

*As quoted in the *Star* (July 27, 1964), the Johannesburg afternoon paper with the widest daily circulation in South Africa to English-speaking, Afrikaner and Bantu readers.

"White" is about 2,000 per year. It is noteworthy that leading Afrikaners advocate the steady absorption of a group numbering over 25% of the white group, whereas the Americans would seem to need centuries to absorb a mere 10-15% of a minority group with better education.

If all is not darkness in the Republic, it is equally true that all is not light. Far from it. There are many grays, some of them darker, and of these the world is informed in detail and is frequently reminded. For the reader who seeks negative forces at work in South Africa to balance some of the positive points made here, there is no dearth of articles and books giving such details in varying degrees of accuracy.

In addition to genuine wrongs, a principal reason for the possible image of South Africa derives from its free press. It is the most anti-government and freest in Africa. If an editor wrote the kind of personal criticism seen every week in South Africa in the press of Ethiopia, Tanganyika, Egypt, Liberia, Madagascar, Ghana, Angola, or Algeria, he could not publish another paper. The critical "English" press dominates newspaper readership as thoroughly as the National Party dominates politics. Actually, it is usually hit and run reporters who file the sharpest criticism. However, local stringers often file sensational and sometimes malicious stories which would be laughed out of court if submitted to their local anti-government editors.

The fact that many Nationalists, especially on the far right of the party, are hostile to most observers of South Africa, and that some would happily legislate against the

press, does not vitiate these comments or provide a rationalization for subjective reporting. The elephantine Press Commission was a decade in gestation, and is unlikely eventually to produce more than mouse-sized legislation.

If light is to shine, war avoided, and in the end American policy is to play an effective role for the welfare of all the citizens of South Africa, a first essential is that Americans understand South Africa, not in the sense of turning criticism to praise, but of truly appreciating the historical experiences, the day-to-day mechanics, and something of the operation of South Africa in the realm of foreign policy-making.

But the need for better understanding of South African policy and how it is formulated is by no means confined to the United States. There is massive ignorance in the foreign ministries of Africa about the Republic. The writer has discussed South Africa at one time or another with nearly all the prominent leaders in Africa from Senghor to Tubman, Nkrumah, Mboya, Nyerere, Tshombe, Banda and others. Dr. Banda is by far the best informed from first-hand experience. Understandably, the further south one moves, the better the knowledge. It is more than coincidence that militancy against South Africa is most violent in Ben Bella's Algeria and lessens almost in proportion to how close the Republic is approached. In some respects, antipathy is a square of the distance.

Probable Prime Minister Seretse Khama of Bechuanaland is no lover of any form of segregation and has himself been *persona non grata* in the Republic from the days of his

marriage to a London business woman, but his interest in the welfare of his own people and his own great wisdom keep him from rash outbursts and promote his expressed desire for peaceful relations with the Republic.

Most recently, the writer has been working among the Basuto, that mountain nation entirely surrounded by the Republic and on the threshold of its own independence. The Paramount Chief, the Basuto mineworkers, the politicians of nearly every political coloration, all speak of a need to live and let live with South Africa. Neighborliness begins with one's neighbors and this applies to both Basuto and South Africans who may together provide a small lead to a solution of the overwhelming race problem in all of southern Africa.

Although the most urgently pressing political issue between the United States and South Africa revolves around South West Africa, possibly the most constructive opportunity for progressive cooperation lies in the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and in new dimensions to the Bantustan theory and practice.

There will be those in America and in South Africa whose viewpoint is quite different from that of the foregoing. Interpretations vary violently at this critical stage of South African history. From the political left in America and South Africa, and from some African states, there will be those who strenuously disagree. Certainly from the right in South Africa will again come condemnation. But the author believes that a majority of Americans, a majority of

Afrikaners, and a majority of English-speaking, African, Coloured and Indian South Africans wish to see the problems of South Africa worked out in relative peace, and not through attempts to bludgeon particular solutions by any foreign power or combination of powers.

But we are moving beyond the bounds of this Foreword. Regardless of the political views so far expressed, the description and analysis of the Notes which follow are an attempt to delineate as accurately and as objectively as possible, how South African foreign policy is made, and with particular reference to the United States.

These Notes were originally not intended for publication. Indeed, they arose day by day as the author found it necessary to deepen his knowledge and to try to obtain some insight into the formation of foreign policy. They are offered to the few people who may possibly share an interest in the subject, in the hope that out of understanding may come some ways to ameliorate suffering and to avoid the dark cloud of hostility which today appears to be gathering upon the horizon.

These Notes are not definitive. No thorough study of South African policy-making has been written, and this book makes no pretense at such scholarship. It is certainly not possible at this stage. This is not so much because a great deal of information remains classified and under lock and key. That kind of material is on policy *per se* and will in time be available to historians. Rather, the difficulty is to capture the subtle nuances as well as the myriad strands of interpersonal relations which not only defy clear pinpoint-

ing today, but may well become hazier in the future. Decades hence the written material will remain but spoken words and unrecorded thoughts are usually irretrievable. But in the future one could freely identify sources. This has not been possible in these notes. In an age when there is too much writing, especially in newspaper dispatches, *uit die duim gesuig* (sucked out of the thumb, as the Afrikaners say), the writer apologizes in advance for instances where it is obvious someone is being quoted but no name or source given. Quite deliberately, the Notes have been given a contemporary gloss which will date some of them before they are in cold type. However, it is perhaps of some merit to detail the situation at the beginning of 1965 rather than make broad generalizations of limited validity at any one time.

These introductory comments are addressed primarily to non-South Africans who may by chance see South Africa only through the haze of uniformly hostile and sometimes distorted reports. But to those few Afrikaner Nationalists who chance on these pages, the writer would stress his observations over many years that major political and material inequities are all too evident within South Africa. Until such inequities are significantly reduced, by whatever means, be they well-tried or original, such inequities constitute in themselves—and most thinking Afrikaners will agree with this—a continuing and even growing threat to the well-being of the Afrikaans-speaking people. The complacency inherent in the shibboleth “*alles sal regkom*” (all will come right) will be fatal unless the added thought

goes deep into the society, to wit: "*maar ons moet werk*" (but we must work).

What follows is essentially descriptive and not predictive. Perhaps the latter is fortunate because, as has often been pointed out, South Africa is a veritable graveyard of social science predictions.

NOTES ON THE FORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

A Brief History

THE FORMATION of the Union of South Africa in 1910 did not immediately lead to a South African foreign service. In World War I there was an Imperial War Cabinet in which General Smuts played a leading role. At the Treaty of Versailles, Prime Minister Botha and Defense Minister Smuts officially represented the Union as a "High Contracting Party." At this time, the Union also became a founding member of the League of Nations. Thus South Africa had a diplomatic role without having a diplomatic service.

The actual establishment of a Department of External Affairs did not come about until June 1, 1927, with General Hertzog taking the portfolio in addition to his Prime Ministership. Professor H. D. J. Bodenstein of Stellenbosch University became the working head of the department as a Secretary of General Hertzog.

However, the formation of the Union was in many ways a step back in diplomatic experience and status for much of the territory embracing South Africa. Dating back to Jan van Riebeeck in 1652, local representatives of the Dutch East India Company had carried on discussions with the indigenous Hottentots. Frontier negotiations continued between various European and African groups for two hundred years.

The first true recognition of the right of South Africans to carry on crude foreign relations of a sort was the Sand River Convention in 1852, at which "emigrant farmers residing north of the Vaal River" were one party and British officials were the other party to the settlement of boundary differences. As de Kiewiet points out in his *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics*, "to the Transvaal Boers it was the charter of their independence."

The "Government of the South African Republic" (the Transvaal) formally joined with the "Republic of Lydenburg" in 1859, signed a treaty with the Kingdom of Portugal in 1869, and one with the Orange Free State in 1872. The Free State had already made its own treaty with Portugal in 1867 and the Convention of Aliwal with Great Britain in 1869.

The first "General Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Extradition" concluded by the Orange Free State was with the United States of America, and signed by State Secretary Hoehne of Bloemfontein and Willard W. Edgcomb, "Special Agent of the United States and Its Consul at the Cape of Good Hope," dated January 22, 1871.

All of these agreements, conventions and treaties and many more required someone on the South African side to play formal diplomatic roles, but foreign policy-making was embryonic. The Portuguese sent a consul to the Transvaal in the 1860's, and the Transvalers reciprocated twenty years later. South Africa's first formal department concerned with foreign relations was organized by that vigorous Hollander, Dr. W. J. Leyds, the State Secretary of the

South African Republic (Transvaal). Leyds later represented President Kruger and the Transvaalers in Europe during the Boer War or War for South African Independence. But before this, Cornelis van Boeschoten had become "Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs," and thus, as Eric Rosenthal concludes in his pioneering pamphlet, *South African Diplomats Abroad*, "the Transvaal created the first true 'Foreign Office' in our history."

There is no need to discuss all the diplomatic exchange of the late 19th century up to and including the final peace treaty and the formation of the Union. The point is that by 1910 South Africa, or at least two of its constituent states, had carried on wide diplomatic representation through experienced diplomats, operating out of a foreign office. The seventeen-year hiatus which followed saw South Africa fall behind even its fellow member of the Commonwealth, Canada, in its diplomatic development.

Although Prime Minister Hertzog was under some pressure for South African representation after the Irish Free State sent a Minister to Washington, the General explained in 1925 that the usefulness of envoys would not justify their expense. What caused the breakthrough, in the judgment of historian Eric Walker, were three events: the Balfour Declaration, the enhancement of a sense of national dignity in all the Dominions when Canada was elected to the League Council, and finally when Canada did send her own minister to Washington. So in 1927 South Africa began wearing a diplomatic cloak.

Expansion of the fledgling Department of External Af-

fairs was slow until 1948. The first legations were established in Washington, the Hague and Rome in 1929. By 1934, there were representatives also in Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, Brussels and Lisbon. All of this time, of course, South Africa, as a member of the Commonwealth, had what became known as a High Commissioner in London. South Africa's role in the League of Nations continued to be strong, and in 1937 and 1938, the South African delegate, Mr. Charles te Water, was Chairman of the Assembly of the League.

What is germane to our topic through all these years is that while South Africa was gradually being represented in more and more foreign capitals, the formation of major South African foreign policy was still largely in London. There it remained for the most part, right up until 1948, despite a significant broadening out after the Statute of Westminster in 1931, and through the strong sense of South African nationalism exercised by General Hertzog. The close identification of General Smuts with Great Britain may have delayed a weaning process already under way in the "white dominions." The ascendancy of the National Party in 1948 is a watershed for three reasons: firstly, as we have suggested, because the new leaders did not identify British interests as their own; secondly, because Great Britain soon began to cool off towards South Africa, and even before South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, she was no longer a bosom friend whom Britain wanted to sponsor; and thirdly, the election results led to a marked shift within South Africa as to what groups came to have

some bearing upon the formation of foreign policy. Before coming to these groups in turn, let us begin with the South African Foreign Service.

South African Foreign Service

It is essential, first of all, to recognize that South African policy is formed in a much different manner than United States foreign policy or British foreign policy.

The line between what is official and unofficial is a very sharp one in South Africa. On the official side of the line, policy is made by a very small number of people and that foreign policy is carried out by only a handful of professional diplomats. South Africa is desperately short of foreign service officers and of senior men with a broad perspective and experience who can be entrusted to undertake difficult tasks.

The reply to the Report of the Special Committee of the UN, headed by Sir Hugh Foot (now Lord Caradon), had to be drafted by the lone Undersecretary with one assistant. In the State Department, perhaps a dozen people would have had a hand in such a key drafting, not to mention other government people. Needless to say, the whole initial draft would not have had to be done by as high ranking an officer as Undersecretary, a man who had to carry on all his heavy regular schedule at the same time the lengthy document was prepared.

But let us examine briefly the organization of the South African Foreign Service. Total figures of foreign service establishments are difficult to compare, and further, as

South African Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, J. K. Uys, says, "in a foreign service quality is most important" and "the number of foreign missions is critical." South Africa's establishment of 600 is roughly comparable on a total population basis with those of Australia (200) and Canada (400), when one considers that not being a member of the Commonwealth imposes extra burdens on the Republic. The sudden cessation of exchanged diplomatic dispatches and, in particular, intelligence reports, following South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth, has not entirely been made good. It is true that South Africans had felt for some time that Great Britain had been winnowing out the flow and editing the information passed on. When Ghana became a Commonwealth member, reports from there had automatically stopped being transmitted. Much of the routine material could not be duplicated by South Africa's staff.

The professional South African staff, according to the 1964/5 estimate, consists of about 168 officers in Pretoria and 431 stationed abroad at any one time. This is approximately the same as the whole U.S. Foreign Service in 1924, which was only up to 826 by 1940, against 4,000 in 1964.

The countries with which South Africa exchanges diplomatic representatives have, as one might expect, about the same number of people in South Africa as the South Africans have abroad. Thus there are some thirteen officials in and from Germany, four in and from Australia, nine from Portugal compared with five in Lisbon, plus three in Angola and four in Mozambique.

The most striking difference in representation is the American professional contingent of over forty in South Africa compared with the Republic's twenty plus in the U.S. To the latter might be added another four regulars at the United Nations, beefed up at session time, but on balance the site of the UN in New York means that South Africa's representation is less able to concentrate upon the U.S.

The smallness of the South African foreign service is further shown by the fact that there is a professional diplomat for every 26,000 citizens of South Africa compared with about one for every 13,000 in the U.S. But, if you take only the white South African population, the figure is one in 5,000.

South Africa does not utilize the skills of many citizens outside the civil service as members of delegations and so on. On the old C.C.T.S. (Technical Commission for Africa), scientists P. J. du Toit and Meiring Naudé made very favorable impressions, but this kind of appointment is rare.

The severe shortage of top-grade administrative people in the Republic, a function both of the operation of color distinctions and of the relatively uneducated mass of the population, suggests that only a decision of critical national importance could secure more top caliber manpower for the foreign service.

Added to the color distinction is the political one which plays a role in all countries, but especially so in South Africa, between the main white groups. In most years, fewer than 10% of those applying for the South African foreign service are English-speaking. Curiously, the top ranks of

the service—below the Ambassadorial level—are heavily represented by English-speaking officers whose entry paralleled the later years of the Smuts' United Party dominance of the political scene. This "English" pattern carried on in some ways, including selection, for almost five years of National Party rule, overlapping the tenure of Secretary of External Affairs, D. D. Forsyth, who had been appointed in 1941.

Almost two decades later, many of these men dating from the "Smuts" era have worked their way up, minus some who resigned for essentially political reasons. At one stage in the late 1950's, four key promotions in a row to ministerial rank were to English-speaking officers. Although some "English" were concerned lest their being "English" might hurt promotion and thus did not join the foreign service, in actual fact, the Nationalist government has probably leaned over backwards in this regard. One promising officer who resigned after 1955 and who has been referred to as a political "martyr," is quite frank in saying that, in actual fact, he suffered no discrimination nor would he have because of being "English." Boom conditions and the prospect of a well-paying job for a bright BA with Anglo American, or others, is a more difficult recruiting hurdle to overcome.

Nevertheless, the general lack of interest in government service by English-speaking South Africans noticeably narrows the chances of employing the best "European" brains, regardless of language group. Certain delays in the issuance of visas were attributed on at least one occasion by G. P.

Jooste, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the manpower shortage.

We are not concerned here with the promotion of South African policy, but rather with its formation. But one may observe *inter alia* that while plans have been mooted from time to time, South Africa has not repeated its sending of a Coloured representative as part of a semi-official mission. When Coloured Trade Union leader Edgar Deane was a member of a delegation to an ILO meeting in Geneva, he certainly scored a qualified success, but subsequently bitter attacks by the Afrikaner-dominated iron and steel workers union led to intra-National Party acrimony.

The South African Foreign Service has fewer purely political appointments than do most services, including the American. Occasionally, as with the appointment of F. C. Erasmus as Ambassador to Italy, a cabinet minister may find a mutually agreeable way of leaving the cabinet. Or again, as with the appointment of Dr. Carel De Wet to the Court of St. James, strong party pressures are at work, but this is not the general pattern. London has long been considered a post equivalent to cabinet rank and best filled by someone with close political ties with the Prime Minister. When Gerhard Jooste was appointed to London, Dr. D. F. Malan had a minor cabinet crisis because Jooste was a career diplomat. The Hague is also more political because of the particular Dutch-Afrikaner relationship. The incumbent, former M.P. for Smithfield, J. J. "Buks" Fouché, is an example.

While the advice of ambassadors may be very good on a

straight interpretive and technical level, their views on foreign policy would not have an important direct or indirect effect upon public consideration unless their appointment has political overtones. Indeed, one often observes in conversation with South African diplomats overseas (an able ambassador on the UN team comes to mind), that their long service abroad has meant that they are not particularly *au fait* with the new personalities on the South African scene, or with the subtle nuances of home politics. They are non-political public servants in a traditionally conservative sense, a stance perhaps to be preferred to the sometimes politically uncontrollable ambassadors the American State Department has been saddled with occasionally. But desirable or not, the South African diplomats do not carry much weight at the highest level of policy making.

Before turning to Ambassadors as potentially strong shapers of policy towards their host country, a brief word is essential about the South African Information Service. It comes under a separate cabinet minister and does not play a major role in shaping policy. An information bureau was started by Prime Minister Hertzog in 1938 and was taken over for wartime propaganda efforts by the Smuts government in 1939. The Nationalists expanded it after 1948, a step bitterly opposed for a long time by the United Party. It has gradually been recognized as an essential arm of the government. Neither a United Party nor a Progressive Party cabinet would dispense with an Information Service.

On the whole, members of the Information Service have been junior to the diplomats and often considered inferior. There is a difference of attitude between the two groups. The information officers are in much closer, more frequent and, in most countries, in more hostile contact with the general public than are the diplomats. Information officers carry the brunt of personal attacks at meetings, on television programs, and in correspondence. They are often more anxious for minor changes "at home" which might make their task easier. On the whole, they are in closer touch with South Africa, many having come from "civilian" life fairly recently, and are more personally involved in South African internal developments than the sometimes more aloof diplomats.

The origins of information officers are significantly different from those of foreign service officers. The former are less career-oriented. A large number have joined the Information Service from Afrikaans newspapers *and* they could fairly easily go back to journalism. Quite a few have done so. One disadvantage they have abroad is that they are so accustomed to writing extensively in Afrikaans that quite often news releases and publications in English come through somewhat stilted, as though the thoughts have been jelled in Afrikaans and then translated. Another difference of value to information officers is that they are far freer to write articles and books which have a direct or peripheral relation to their work.

In 1964, the Information Service began a reorganization

into various international desks with the object of achieving greater specialization. This may help to professionalize the Service and bring it closer to the Foreign Service.

There is precious little understanding, even in key South African circles, of the tremendous emotional hammering a South African diplomat or information officer receives during a tour of duty in America or at the United Nations. Take one of dozens of actual examples. A newly arrived diplomat, who has made a few friends, had a large number of acceptances for a special luncheon featuring the foods of South Africa, which he had to finance himself. But to show their dislike of his country, a great majority of people who had accepted didn't turn up, and the food was wasted. When almost the same incident happened a year earlier to a South African official in Addis Ababa, the only consolation was that an outstanding Ghanaian of the United Nations came specifically to call, and to share the shattered evening. Not many people can accept repeated actions of this kind with a smile.

Some try to avoid it by letting the foreigners they meet know that they are strongly "anti-government" and therefore "good guys," but do not resign on a matter of principle. Those of character, who attempt to fulfill their mission, frequently undergo a temporary change of personality. Men who have gone through the process have said, after they had returned to South Africa and had recovered a natural ebullience, that eight to ten months in New York or Washington, without a recharging of emotional batteries at home, is about the limit of fully effective work. To be-

come bitter, sour, or cynical over personal rebuffs can be as negative an effect on clear observation and reporting as to go overboard in a pro-American direction.

Another problem former South African diplomats, and particularly information officers, are quick to comment on, is that they sometimes find it impossible to get clearcut answers to some questions of government policy. Although this has improved in recent years, when a critical issue becomes a football within the government, the poor officer abroad cannot get a directive after repeated requests, and takes his chances with his own interpretation. It has never been as serious as the impact some aspects of the McCarthy period had on American diplomats in Asia, but it still remains a problem to a diplomat's projections, as well as a complication when they wish to report reactions to various government policies. The frequent solution to the dilemma is to ignore it.

Except for the Information Service, the South African establishment in no way approaches the American proliferation of non-foreign service organizations and people attached to diplomatic posts. About 75-85% of the establishment in diplomatic and consular posts comes directly under the South African Foreign Service, a figure roughly comparable to the American practice before World War II. However, in current terms, U.S. Ambassador Bruce in London recently estimated that only some 23% of the 800-odd people under his embassy were State Department people. Although one may anticipate more South African personnel abroad concerned with trade, defense, information, agri-

culture, intelligence, atomic energy, and so on, it does not appear that South Africa faces anything like the American personnel explosion.

Ambassadors

One exception to the general rule that ambassadors do not carry as much weight in the formation of South African foreign policy as they do for some nations, was the tenure in Washington of the present South West Administrator, Wentzel C. du Plessis. His dispatches were fact-packed and made definite policy recommendations. These he followed up with long personal letters to friends in the cabinet. But as an ambassador, du Plessis was in an exceptionally strong position. He had come up the hard way in the embryo service until General Smuts forced him out because he belonged to the *Broederbond* (a band of brothers—actually top-level Afrikaners). But then du Plessis defeated Smuts in the Standerton constituency in the 1948 election. Returning to diplomacy on a contract basis, Ambassador du Plessis had unusual political strength and let the chips fall where they might in his reporting. Today, he is a power beyond that of any ex-ambassador when it comes to policy plans.

Needless to say, on a day-to-day level of ordinary business, recommendations of all senior diplomats are followed. But it doesn't take much out of a routine nature to have the full decision shifted to Pretoria. In fact, it can be said that Pretoria keeps very tight reins on those stationed abroad. Part of this derives from the closeknit nature of the Foreign Service, and some from hard experience. Perhaps even

more of the thoroughly experienced diplomats are concentrated in the home capital than in most foreign services. This means that their judgments genuinely need to be sent to foreign capitals. If this is a partial reflection on the quality and independent judgment of some South African diplomats stationed abroad, it is as much a recognition that their task is an exceptionally difficult one. Some are relatively young, some are older and not experienced in high level diplomacy, while a few are politicians or military men who have marked ability but who require close liaison.

The amount of freedom to act varies as it does in most civil service situations. The current head of the mission in Sweden, Mr. Hamilton, has a relatively free hand, as did J. Stewart recently in Vienna. The same rein was not given to earlier ambassadors in Paris and the Hague.

Prime Minister Verwoerd personally peruses a good many diplomatic dispatches. Few people realize how closely he keeps his hands on the pulse of the whole country. The editor of an Information Service magazine received a detailed criticism of a whole issue including subject matter, the quality of the writing in Afrikaans and English, and even the magazine's layout. A few South Africans do realize how the Prime Minister is keenly aware of the personality of a Deputy Party Secretary in a remote district, and there are some who decry this dissipation of talent. The same cry is raised critically about President Johnson. But the same propensity is the source of many admiring anecdotes about Winston Churchill. When it comes to diplomatic dispatches from even a minor post, the Prime Minister

has been known to pen an encouraging letter of commendation for a rather outspoken speech and, on another occasion to the same man, warn him that his interpretation of government policy was a little too imaginative.

The Office of Foreign Minister

The limited number of top quality staff, and a lack of public feeling for foreign policy making, are both legacies of South African historical development. Until 1948, South Africa did not really have a foreign policy. Decisions were essentially made in London, and even the Statute of Westminster in 1931 did not in itself create a need for a foreign policy separate from that of Great Britain. The external affairs portfolio was held by Prime Ministers until the appointment of Eric H. Louw to that ministry on January 10, 1955, with the advent of the first Strijdom cabinet. His wealth of diplomatic experience in Britain, Europe, and the U.S. made him the obvious choice. But even then, Mr. Louw combined External Affairs with the Finance portfolio, a virtually impossible task at today's volume of work. Later still, under Mr. Strijdom, Louw held only the External Affairs post and continued to do so under Dr. Verwoerd.

Earlier in Malan's regime, Mr. Louw had combined the economic affairs and mining portfolios. In addition, his voice was strong in foreign affairs where Dr. Malan was not particularly at home. When the author discussed this with Dr. Malan after his retirement, the former Prime Minister's lack of knowledge of emergent Africa was constantly evident. Although Dr. Malan did not speak particularly warm-

ly of Mr. Louw, albeit Louw is a Cape man, Malan's professional respect was very high. Minister Louw usually worked closely with the Transvaal right wing of the National Party and was not a member of the inner circle of Cape Nationalists.

Thus South Africa's present Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, is only the second man to hold such a cabinet position except for Prime Ministers. The identification of South Africa with British goals was carried on extraordinarily long, mainly because of the personality of General Smuts, his personal identification with Britain, and his great stature throughout the Commonwealth. It was not really as a South African, but as a British statesman, that Smuts had a hand in drafting the charter of the United Nations. Reminiscing about Smuts, former President Harry Truman once told the author with characteristic candor: "General Smuts and I started the United Nations together." Most leading statesmen up until the time of Smuts' death thought of him almost exclusively against an international backdrop. South African domestic politics, and even such "black marks" as the way Smuts crushed the Bondelswarts Rebellion did not feature.

Certainly, English-speaking South Africans and the *bloedsappe* (die-hard Afrikaans supporters of the old South African Party) were more than content to let Smuts conduct foreign affairs as he saw fit in Whitehall. A contributing factor to this lack of a separate national approach was the overwhelming influence of the English language press and the fact that virtually all editors and many sub-

editors were British-born and looked upon South Africa as a natural extension of their loyalty to the United Kingdom. Only the small and struggling Afrikaans press, so cavalierly dismissed as "extremist" by the powerful English press lords, took a foreign policy position which saw South African goals as somewhat different from British goals.

All this background contributes importantly to the tradition of South African foreign policy being made at a very high level, usually in the Prime Minister's office. In the first years of Dr. Verwoerd's Prime Ministership, there was no doubt that his preoccupation with Bantu affairs and with white party politics, plus the long-established reign of Eric Louw, meant that foreign policy was heavily influenced by Mr. Louw. Later, as Dr. Verwoerd gained a firmer hold of the many reins of government, he took an increasing interest in foreign affairs and in the threats to South Africa posed by them. This was forced in part as foreign affairs became crucial to the domestic issues he was focussing on. However, Dr. Verwoerd is no late comer to foreign policy. Even when he was Minister of Bantu Affairs, he often took a strong position in cabinet discussions. Relatively senior officials in Foreign Affairs often joked that policy must be passed by the Official Minister and the real Minister. Dr. Verwoerd's strength in foreign affairs derived, as it did on many Cabinet subjects, from his hard work on the facts and his first-class mind.

Convincing evidence exists that Dr. Verwoerd wished Mr. Louw to retire from the cabinet at least two years before his withdrawal at the end of 1963. The great enthusi-

asm which marked Mr. Louw's return from the 1961 session at the United Nations and the flow of congratulatory statements by the Prime Minister and by the Afrikaans press almost suffocated Mr. Louw in flowers. Repeated calls for his replacement by the English press made it essential to the Prime Minister that, despite a little helping along, the retirement had to have a genuinely voluntary quality about it.

It was actually *Die Burger* in Mr. Louw's own Cape Province which led the move for his replacement. In June/July 1963, *Die Burger* harped on the general theme that Mr. Louw would not (and should not) lead the delegation to the United Nations. Later, *Die Burger* was backed by *Dagbreek*. The delegation was led by Foreign Affairs Secretary G. P. Jooste, a highly seasoned diplomat, backed up by three ambassadors on temporary assignment from London, Ottawa, and Washington, plus the regular UN ambassador. After Mr. Louw's stay at home, the changeover was anti-climactic. Today, Mr. Louw lives in Cape Town and serves on the Electricity Board, but is not often consulted on foreign affairs. Once he announced he would make quite a few revelations at a National Party Congress, but so far he has made little public comment.

In comparison, Foreign Minister Muller lacks Louw's long professional experience, but is far more diplomatic in the sense of interpersonal relations. Muller was a Latin scholar at the University of Pretoria, and is a lawyer. He served as a highly popular Mayor of Pretoria before entering full-time politics. Dr. Muller immediately distinguished

himself on the parliamentary back bench, but he was no rocket to shoot up and then explode. He spoke sparingly and modestly, but always thoughtfully, and his personal charm, quiet demeanor, and reasonableness made an appeal to the English press. But he studiously avoided all opposition efforts to cast him as a backbench "rebel." This technique worked on the former Nationalist backbencher, J. de P. Basson, as part of a process of destroying him politically within the National Party.

Those who sat with Dr. Muller in the parliamentary dining room noted how all shades of National Party M. P.'s accepted him, and how, without ever being inconsistent in his arguments, he was admired by people who strenuously disagreed among themselves.

It is almost certain that Prime Minister Verwoerd was deliberately grooming Dr. Muller for ministerial rank when he sent him to London as High Commissioner and later as Ambassador. It was also known privately, that when he was sent to the 1963 session of the General Assembly as a member of the delegation under G. P. Jooste, a higher rank was in store for him.

Nothing quite illustrates a change in an Afrikaner attitude as the present lack of criticism in appointing a former Rhodes Scholar as Foreign Minister. More than one cabinet minister refused to attend Oxford because of personal dislike or a desire to avoid an English "brainwash." It is true that Afrikaners have furnished a succession of Rugby heroes for Oxford (Muller himself was such a "blue"), but from 1948-1958 such Oxonian overtones were an extremely poor background for advancement in Nationalist politics.

Foreign Minister Muller had a somewhat sticky start on his return to Parliament when the man who had groomed himself to succeed Eric Louw in the Beaufort West constituency refused to step aside. The bringing in of a Transvaler for a Cape seat was not received too enthusiastically by some Cape party leaders, although this was no reflection upon Dr. Muller. His own popularity and personality, along with the Prime Minister's prestige and power, was what finally carried the day. Being a Transvaler in a Cape seat could mean that you are under suspicion at both ends of the country, but in Muller's case it appears to give him an unusually broad national basis of support. It also happens that the Cape is not blessed with many backbenchers of potential cabinet ability, yet Dr. Verwoerd must keep a certain Cape strength in the cabinet, just as a U.S. president must strike a political balance. All this is an asset to Dr. Muller and is a partial explanation as to why he stood in a safe Cape seat and not from his native Transvaal.

In American terms, Mr. Louw's later years in office are similar to those of John Foster Dulles, and Dulles' relationship with President Eisenhower. The comparison naturally extends to a likening of Mr. Rusk's relationship with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to that of Dr. Muller with Prime Minister Verwoerd. What we have underlined here is that a strong independent Foreign Minister like Mr. Louw is unique in the sweep of South African history.

Mr. Louw was South Africa's first really professional diplomat and, even today, it falls to a mere handful of senior men to carry a tremendous professional and technical burden.

Universities

This scarcity of senior and experienced men is all the more important when one goes outside official ranks and looks at those citizens who might be useful in broad discussions of policy with regard to the United States, for instance. There is no one in South African universities who can truly be called a specialist on U.S. affairs—either in history, politics, or general social and cultural patterns. Highly intelligent professors have travelled the States, a very few twice, but not a single person on the South African academic scene makes it his primary business to remain *au fait* with the contemporary American scene; certainly not at a level represented by a dozen or more American scholars on South Africa.

This is not to say that engineers and economists do not have close contact with professional colleagues in America and that exchange of ideas in academic disciplines is not two-way. But to remain conversant with trends in a professional field is not the same as seeing the society in the round. The task is by no means impossible. Some of the most sapient observers of U.S. society from de Tocqueville through D. W. Brogan have been non-Americans. Given a few motivated people and some financial backing, there could be a core of people in South Africa who understood the U.S.—“warts and all,” as the saying goes.

Lack of academic study of Africa north of the Republic is also marked in South Africa. There are hundreds of Americans (1,000 attend the annual African Studies Asso-

ciation meeting) compared with perhaps a dozen academicians in the Republic who look to Africa beyond the Limpopo. One would not expect that South Africa, drawing primarily from 3,000,000 whites, could equal the United States, drawing from a population of 200,000,000, in research personnel. But South Africa might well be expected to meet the U.S. on equal manpower terms in studying such key neighbors in southern Africa as Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia and Zambia. The familiar reasons—lack of money, heavy teaching schedules, rigid curricula, lack of imaginative foundation leadership, so important in the U.S., all add up to the simple fact that South African universities fall far behind what might reasonably be expected.

There are also some disciplinary factors. Anthropology was not enthusiastically received in Afrikaans-medium universities for some years; in part a hangover of anti-evolution sentiments. A more serious gap has arisen from the general status of political science in South African institutions. The straightforward "government" courses are there, but with notable exceptions political science as such has been slow to develop. A few years ago the writer acted as chairman for one session of a Natal University Social Science Conference drawing papers from the whole Republic, and at the time remarked on the fact that no one at the conference claimed to be primarily a political scientist. Admittedly, one or two of the historians and philosophers had published in what is generally considered political science, and one genuine political scientist from Johannesburg was unable to attend, but the final result was that economics,

history, anthropology, sociology and psychology were discussed in some excellent papers without a political science critique. Among the hundred-odd books in the last decade on the political patterns of emergent Africa, the writer is not aware of a major academic study by a South African.

Strange as it may sound, probably the best informed academician on Africa is Pretoria University Theology Professor Ben Marais, a frequent traveller in black Africa, and a contributor to the press.

Without belaboring the point, it is evident that South African foreign policy makers are lacking help from the universities in understanding more about the United States, and not much more on the rest of the African continent. Indeed, those few university people in the latter category are, for the most part, on political outs with the government and in many cases would neither offer advice nor find it requested.

The Press

The newspaper level is almost as barren. A major weakness in South African understanding of the United States—one which could seriously affect the American effort to be understood, for good or ill, by South Africa—is the lack of a single permanent correspondent in the United States representing the Afrikaans language press.

Occasional tours are made by newspapermen, and some of these produce considerable insight, such as the 1963 visit of J. J. Scholtz, Foreign Editor of *Die Burger* in Cape Town. But if the United States is a large and highly complex so-

ciety, even lengthy tours could not produce the consistently informed judgments of a Denis Brogan, an Alistair Cooke, a Raymond Aron, or a significant number of European observers. The English language press is represented by a regular correspondent in New York. He is rather swamped with picking up stories from the U.S. press for transmission, and rarely has time to offer any analytical insights on the U.S. scene. While the representative is more than a "clip and paste" man, he is not a broad observer of the American scene. Reuters, Agence France Presse, and the American news agencies send the bulk of the routine world news. They obviously do not look for the South African angle nor offer more than bare essentials.

The appointment of a permanent correspondent by the Afrikaans press could have great benefits in creating an atmosphere of better (in the sense of more acute but not necessarily favorable) understanding of the U.S., but the sheer appointment is by no means an unmixed blessing. A tremendous lot depends upon the man.

A senior official of the South African Foreign Office comments that the appointment of a special representative of the South African Broadcasting Corporation at the 1963 United Nations session was a far from happy development—even though originally encouraged. Several inaccurate "leaks" and some very dubious interpretations broadcast to South Africa seriously heightened the difficulties of the delegation, both in representing South Africa, and also being understood at home. Afrikaans journalists who have worked elsewhere in Africa and in the Republic with this

radio representative say that he is known for his disregard for facts that could influence his stereotyped views. All of this did not go unnoticed in the Afrikaans press. *Die Burger* took a critical swipe at the reporting, without involving the weight of its leader page, by having Rykie van Reenen comment unfavorably in her *Van Alle Kante* (from all sides) column.

It is all too easy to write or broadcast in a highly sarcastic and mocking manner of some actions at the United Nations and in the United States. America's experience with the many inside stories about pre-1941 Japan are an example. One concerned the many warships being built which then came down the slip to sink without a trace. Anecdotes such as these with racial overtones were a major disservice to international understanding and prevented Americans from seeing Japan in clear perspective before the lesson of Pearl Harbor. On the other side, Germany has twice grossly misestimated United States attitudes—once at the time of the Zimmerman telegram, and, again, in assessing the willingness and ability to fight in World War II.

Against this background we come back to the deep cleavage between the official and unofficial side of foreign policy making in the Republic. Editorials in *Die Burger*, *Die Transvaler* and other Afrikaans papers have very slight impact upon the formation of policy. One really significant exception is the political column written every Sunday in *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus* by Willem ("Wollie") van Heerden. Although directed at the more intelligent government supporter, they are usually so carefully phrased, and writ-

ten with such a sure sense of Afrikaner history and politics, that when Editor van Heerden points the way, the *volk* are at least prepared to follow. Although the Prime Minister is Chairman of the Board of *Dagbreek* and its fellow papers, there are friendly but deep differences between van Heerden and Dr. Verwoerd on issues such as the place of the Coloured people in the political spectrum.

The other political column with some foreign policy impact is written every Saturday in *Die Burger* by "Dawie." The identity of this anonymous columnist changes from time to time but has been primarily Editor Piet Cillié and Schalk Pienaar in recent years. In the opinion of a foreign service officer above the rank of counselor, "Dawie is carefully read by officers abroad and carries considerable weight." All embassies receive *Die Burger* by airmail. Internally, the unusual South African practice of shifting the locus of government from Pretoria to Cape Town and back every six months means that *Die Burger* and "Dawie" are more influential during parliamentary session when the official hierarchy is in the Cape from January to about June.

The Editor of *Die Transvaler* (Dr. Verwoerd's old post), G. D. Scholtz, is a history scholar (with a Dutch Ph.D.). Scholtz's steady stream of books on foreign policy and on the political dilemma of the Afrikaner, strike a deeply loyal, but nonetheless often shocking note to many Nationalists. They have some influence in intellectual circles, but these circles are well removed from the formation of policy.

The English press editorials have tolled such a consistent note of doom that they now sound not unlike so many squalling children to cabinet members. They are there; they are clearly heard and annoyingly so and sometimes need to be slapped down without seriously interfering with the free press; but they have very little effect. This is not, as is often asserted, because they are censored. As we have said, *no* country in Africa has a press which criticizes the leaders of the country more vehemently, and often with more abusive language, than the press of South Africa. While a majority of American and British journalists tend to follow the political views of the English press in South Africa, few are aware of how often it has cried "wolf" without the predicted disaster following. The sharply pessimistic predictions after Sharpeville may have heightened fear and foreboding in the hearts of white South Africans, and given hope to politically active Africans, but very few of the dire predictions have come true. The English press has postponed from year to year—ever since 1948—the year of a Nationalist debacle.

The withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and the establishment of the Republic by a popular referendum of the white oligarchy, was heralded by newspaper pages drenched with pessimistic forecasts of economic disaster. (Even *Die Burger*, a staunch supporter of the Republic, had some apprehensive moments.) To those who are inclined to support the government anyway, the subsequent record exports to Great Britain and the tremendous boom in the whole economy through 1964, brings smiles at re-reading

the economic comments in much of the English press of 1960.

A difference between the two English-language Johannesburg papers, at variance with the "minimum influence" view above, is illustrated by the observation of a senior official during Mr. Louw's tenure that, "while the *Rand Daily Mail* usually raised the Minister's temper and confirmed him in his beliefs about the English press, Mr. Louw did read *The Star* with great care and on a number of occasions he quietly adopted a line of thought first expressed by a *Star* leader." But even more in South Africa than in the United States, government officials guard against any admission that they might be influenced by a newspaper editorial—especially from *die engelse pers*.

The noticeable editorial swing to the right of the often violently anti-government *Sunday Times* in Johannesburg, with its vast national circulation, seems to reflect the wishes of the English-speaking readers. The dropping of the Progressives, except for some support by the *Rand Daily Mail*, and a bit less by the *Cape Times*, and the stronger support of the conservative United Party opposition, indicates that never-ending forecasts of gloom, doom, and heavy rain when the economic skies are bright and sunny, does not inspire reader confidence. All of this local South African politics only goes to reinforce the long-established pattern that newspaper editorials in either the Afrikaans or English press do not play a significant role in the formation of foreign policy. As for the cautious or radical "non-white" press, it usually sticks to domestic matters and clearly iden-

tifiable bread and butter issues. Its views do not count a ticky (a nickel's worth).

What we have said about journalists is against the background assumption that what the New York *Times* or San Francisco *Chronicle* or Walter Lippman or "Scotty" Reston have to say about foreign policy does have a bearing in its broad formulation in the United States. Whereas President Kennedy made a habit of calling in foreign correspondents who had been abroad to privately pick their brains, and President Johnson meets and talks informally with newsmen, the same behind-the-scenes contact does not exist in South Africa.

An Afrikaans journalist who supports the government may pick up most valuable pointers in a trip through Africa, and much information he cannot print. But the idea that the Prime Minister would call in such a man and actually seek his views is alien to traditional practice and particularly to the Prime Minister's style of government.

Even more alien is the idea of a calculated leak or the encouragement of a favorable editorial in the Nationalist press. There are times when Afrikaans editors could assist the acceptance of foreign policy decisions by preparing the public, but this is not the practice. When *Die Burger* sensed the possibility of the British and American *demarches* on the political side of the Odendaal Report on South West, the Prime Minister was furious. He accused the Nationalist caucus of a leak and raised the matter in a cabinet meeting. And yet the intuition of *Die Burger* actually did help the Prime Minister when he came to make his statement in

Parliament, at least temporarily suspending the application of certain political suggestions in the light of the international situation. The actual leak was in London, but this was after the anticipation by the Cape Nationalist paper.

Further to the press, it is not generally known, even in South African newspaper circles, but several times a year—and almost always at the opening of Parliament—the Prime Minister meets with all the editors of the Afrikaans papers. This is a two-day exchange of views, often frank and sometimes quite heated, but it is neither the occasion for the Prime Minister to establish a “line” on foreign policy for Afrikaner editors, nor for them to present a consistent viewpoint.

The major response from the dominant National Party camp to leaders in the English press is an occasional slap back by Afrikaans papers in their editorial columns. Neither Jack Patten, Editor of the Johannesburg *Star*, nor his very capable assistant editor, Rene de Villiers, claim any significant influence on the ordinary run of foreign affairs. In recent months, Patten has strengthened the *Star's* coverage of the U.S. by running many pieces by James Reston. The *Rand Daily Mail* is also a Walter Lippman fan, and together this means far better insights into the U.S. than previously existed.

To the great credit of the *Star* and the Argus group of papers generally, they have established a highly capable Africa News Service which has given the readers of the English press current understanding of the unfolding development of Africa.

News/Check, the South African equivalent of *Newsweek*, has a consistently heavy coverage of major African developments. Its depth pieces do shed light on certain aspects of foreign policy, and its high level subscribers (including the Foreign Minister), are exposed to some original foreign policy thinking. However, while it is strongly pro-South African, it is not consistently pro- or anti-government, which makes *News/Check* suspect by the left and reduces any weight it may carry in inner government circles.

The Afrikaans press often sees America only with a blind eye. As late as September 1, 1964, Afrikaans papers seemed convinced (especially *Die Vaderland* in Johannesburg and its editor, A. M. Van Schoor) that a Goldwater win was almost assured—an assessment that neither Republican nor Democratic papers in the U.S. made as of that date.

The publication with the most influence on South African policy relative to its very limited circulation is the *South African Observer*. This militantly anti-Communist, anti-liberal, anti-American, anti-Semitic, and anti-Negro monthly is to be found in the waiting room of virtually every cabinet minister. It quotes extensively from American authors of the far right and shares a suspicion of the non-Communism of such men as President Eisenhower and Chancellor Adenauer. At an earlier stage, when the Nationalist Party was hungry for English-speaking support, the *Observer* was subsidized by the party, but this ended several years ago. Today, although it does not carry advertising and appears to have a very small circulation, it re-

mains as the editorial outlet for the far right wing of the Nationalist Party. Minister Albert Hertzog is in this assemblage, as is businessman Jaap Marais in Pretoria.

A good many leading Afrikaners have been hammered by *The Observer*, including the head of the Trust Bank, Jan Marais, and Anton Rupert of Rembrandt. Among the institutions attacked vociferously are the South African Foundation, the United States South African Leader Exchange Program, and *News/Check* magazine. The *Sunday Times* is virtually dismissed as Communistic, and the full batteries are reserved to salvo on dangerous influences within the government fold.

The Churches

Not even the Dutch Reformed Churches, which many people would expect to be closer to a National Party government, have influence on foreign affairs. The Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk is so much on the defensive from rightist attacks claiming it is "liberalistic" that the minor role it once had in its relation to the World Council of Churches, and the various Presbyterian groups, has declined. This is not to underestimate the tremendous role of the N. G. Church and also of the Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerk in everyday life in South Africa and, in the Transvaal, upon party politics. But not on foreign affairs. The occasional visit of some N. G. churchmen to Christian conferences in independent Zambia and elsewhere are countenanced. But any conclusions they may reach are not brought to bear on South Africa. Some of the self-annointed and frequently hypocritical Anglican critics have

had a slight effect on policy, but their criticism has influence in the opposite direction from their intentions.

Traditionally, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk has had a strong ecumenical and international flavor. It was important at the famous 1910 Edinburgh Conference and also sent many missionaries and built many schools in Nyasaland, East Africa and Nigeria. But even the N. G. Church has become increasingly isolationist in its outlook. This psychological withdrawal from the world works strongly counter to playing a role in foreign policy making.

Military

The armed forces of South Africa have a long history of defending their country, including World War I, the many battles in North Africa and in Italy in World War II and, more recently, in Korea, where the South African fliers excelled.

The tradition of military non-interference in South African political affairs is a deep one and unlikely to change. The only real challenge came in 1914 (*Die Rebelle*) when Afrikaner officers, such as Beyers, resigned to take up arms against the state. It was political opposition, put down by Afrikaner politicians and supported by the army.

The morale of the army (also a small navy and growing air force) was severely strained after 1948 by the wholesale replacement or resignation of English-speaking senior officers thought to be pro-United Party or actually lacking in loyalty. Defense Minister Erasmus told an Afrikaans reporter in the fifties that he could not trust the air force.

In Natal and elsewhere, there was considerable resentment of the removal of some traditional insignia associated with Britain and the Crown. In 1955, two officers of Natal regiments told the writer that their senior officers were prepared to block the police in a move on behalf of the then strong Federal Party. It is likely that these English enthusiasts overestimated the importance of criticism in the Officers' Mess. Most of the changes represent efforts on the part of the new government in power to organize the armed forces according to its own likes. There was no reciprocal attempt by officers to influence politics. Since the advent of former Free State Administrator Jim Fouché as Minister of Defense, the armed forces have been markedly strengthened in a material sense and also in their morale. The latter is extremely high now and the Afrikaans-English cleavage is at a nadir.

While South Africa has military attachés in key posts, and certainly has bought heavily from Great Britain and France, as well as some planes from the U.S., one can say with certainty that the influence of the South African military upon the formation of South African foreign policy is quite minimal. Although a new defense industry has been successfully launched, there is no basis whatever for the kind of warning given by President Eisenhower about a potentially dangerous civilian-military power group.

In making up South Africa's assessment of the world, and of possible lines of action, the military do play a technical part. They have made specific studies of the military implications for South Africa of developments in Angola,

central Africa and Mozambique, and no doubt will continue to make strategic assessments. But this input to the Prime Minister is nothing like the input provided by the Department of Defense in the United States. Alongside this, South Africa does not have the input of a strong intelligence branch in the Foreign Office nor of a Central Intelligence Agency with highly developed information-gathering and geopolitical forecasting skills. The "Special Branch" or intelligence side of the South African Police does combine both the functions of the Treasury's Secret Service in the U.S. as well as that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It also has a very minor external intelligence role. But whereas in the United States the State Department is only one powerful branch of the government, among other strong branches and minor ones, which contributes to the formation of foreign estimates on which policy may be based, the South African Foreign Office is overwhelmingly the source of estimates and policy recommendations within the South African government.

The General Public

Although this may seem like an unusual topic, stranger still is the fact that the public role is so minimal. There are no public opinion polls on foreign policy. In fact, the European public would be confused and uncertain if asked. This can be a major advantage in foreign policy making at a high level in that policy can be swung significantly in a new direction without a long build-up with the general public, and a certain momentum working against a new

policy. No one has asked the European public what they think of even such a semi-foreign venture as the Transkei policy, let alone what might be done on South West Africa. The European public, including the government's supporters, is quite poorly prepared to express foreign policy views. It is not a matter of public intelligence as much as the very alien quality of the idea of being asked.

Nothing so well sums up the difference in the public role in forming foreign policy in the two countries as the pressure groups. In the United States they are important, but not in South Africa. This is not to say that American policy is blown willy-nilly by the antics of every big expense account lobby. Not at all. But the gradual build-up of an American position is more influenced by a variety of pressure groups. These may be the interest groups such as business or labor, or they may be ethnic or religious subgroups.

Although the over 100,000 members of the Jewish community in South Africa contribute more per capita to Israel than do American Jews, there is not really an Israeli lobby. South Africa was particularly helpful to Israel in the first Israeli-Egyptian war, in part a reflection of Prime Minister Malan's own old testament affection for Israel. But a table-pounding pro-Israel delegation would be given short shrift by the South African Government. The same has applied to Catholic or Anglican delegations, and would apply to ethnic group pressure. There is no organized Dutch, German, or English pressure group. In the past, the views of the important German-speaking minority in South West Africa have been cultivated for their political support to the

National Party. But despite a rapid growth of a new urban German community in South Africa, with its clubs, book-stores, thick monthly magazine (*Afrika Post*) and business links, it is not a pressure group.

Actually, the best organized of the "national groups" are those smaller ones representing countries in eastern Europe. The Yugoslavs are a well-coordinated pro-government and right-wing anti-Communist force. But what is distinct about the Republic is that pro-government groups such as the Yugoslavs, or the broader South African Foundation, are scarcely more welcome to give advice than the "anti" groups.

All governments must resist pressure lest they be blown about by the winds of special interests. But on a comparative basis, the South African government is particularly sensitive in reacting against pressure groups. Try to bulldoze a decision through the South African government and you can almost guarantee its defeat. Not only is this true internally, but it is doubly true externally. On a number of occasions, the South African government might well have generously responded to quiet overtures on some point of change, but once the matter was put in the press and pressure actively applied, the door to discussion was shut and bolted.

Foreign pressure, government and private, particularly from Great Britain, to obtain a decision in the treason case of Mandela and associates at the Rivonia trial, was deeply and bitterly resented by both pro- and anti-government white South Africans. The implication that the elected gov-

ernment would be willing to and could actually succeed in dictating the verdict of the courts is not reflected in the facts.

The false assumption that because South Africa follows a policy so strongly opposed in many foreign countries that it is therefore a full-fledged police state with all the trapping of concentration camps and torture, or that all South African officialdom is somehow corrupt and venal, repeatedly blocks an accurate understanding of the South African scene.

Pressure is viewed at best as basically incompatible with good government and, at worst, as something evil. But this does not mean a rejection of criticism, or least of all, of the decision of the electorate at the polls within the democratic oligarchy.

This applies as well to institutions representing the general public. Neither the geographically restricted Africa Institute in Pretoria nor the S.A. Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg can be said to be at all equivalent to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York or London's Chatham House, as indirect influences in foreign policy making.

The Institute of International Affairs, headed by ex-South African foreign service officer, Gordon Lawrie, has done some research on South West Africa to be ground into the government mill, but not on a policy level. Founded in 1934, the Institute has some 600 members among four branches: The Witwatersrand (Johannesburg), Cape Town, Natal (Durban), and Eastern Province (Port Elizabeth). The Johannesburg and Cape Town branches have

about ten meetings annually. The headquarters are in a handsome new building at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.

Although this Institute's board contains some distinguished South African names, almost none of them with their "English" backgrounds are likely to be listened to in Pretoria. An exception is W. Van Heerden, who is on the board in an obvious attempt to "balance" a bit, but he would by no means become a passive agent to transmit the ideas of the Institute to the Prime Minister.

The Institute thus tends to reflect educated, English-speaking United Party views, although it has no political ties or formal orientation. The Institute had some importance during the Smuts cabinet. However, its current influence, to turn the political axis, is about the same as that of the John Birch Society upon President Johnson's cabinet.

To the government, there is nothing alien about the *Afrika Instituut*. Its major expansion came under the leadership of highly respected W. C. du Plessis. Its present director, Professor P. F. D. Weiss, was a Hebrew scholar at Stellenbosch University and was prominently on the side of the Prime Minister's friends in the split of the SABRA (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs), which subsequently moved to the Transvaal. The leadership of the *Instituut* and its work is strictly *persona grata* with National Party hierarchy where it is not synonymous. Despite their living in the same middle-sized city, the head of the Africa section of Foreign Affairs had not even met the director of the *Afrika Instituut*, even after two years.

The *Afrika Instituut* does receive some \$84,000 annually from the government in return for services. But these are primarily fact-producing and not policy-making.

This *Instituut* is not seeking a large membership currently, and is not concerned with holding many large public meetings. It has produced a number of excellent maps of Africa in its cartographic department, and also publishes a running digest of Africa news. Its headquarters are at the University of South Africa in Pretoria.

So far in our discussion of the general public, nothing has been said of African or Indian or Coloured influence in the formation of South African foreign policy. In any direct sense, none of these groups or individuals from them play a direct role. Of course, the existence of the largely non-franchised African majority and the two non-white minorities, in conjunction with the dominant white minority underlies almost all South African policy with the world.

It is quite possible and indeed likely that in due course some members of these influential groups will come to have a role in the formation of policy. If, for example, Prime Minister Matanzima of the Transkei is particularly anxious that a representative from Basutoland or some other African state be allowed to visit Umtata, this desire would certainly carry substantial weight. If the time is reached when half a dozen "Homeland" Prime Ministers jointly present moderate requests, or in time take direct action themselves in the realm of foreign policy, there will then be one form of an African voice. This would appear much farther away for the Coloured and Indian communities because of the

lack of a territorial base, no matter how rapidly the program of involving them politically in local matters is carried out.

Labor and Farmers

This category is included only because of the acknowledged influence of unions on some aspects of foreign policy in such countries as the United States, United Kingdom, and Holland, and the importance of farmers' organizations in many countries.

In South Africa, neither of these groups carries significant weight. As individuals, farmers are of critical importance to the National Party. They can influence taxes, crop subsidies and transportation, but not specifically foreign policy.

Labor had a voice when it was not primarily Afrikaans as it is today, but that was a generation ago, when it was a strong minor party and did contribute a succession of cabinet ministers.

Business

Almost the only non-official force of much strength which may from time to time contribute significantly to the shaping of South African foreign policy is the business community. This applies less to the dominant English-speaking section than to the growing number of Afrikaner businessmen with international association.

The broad business influence simply supports steps which make South Africa popular and opposes those which make it unpopular, if such a stand is not inconsistent with the defense of the government and a deep sense of South African loyalty, irrespective of which white group, or even Indian

or Coloured group, the man belongs to. The half a dozen Indians on a 1964 Natal trade delegation to Great Britain are not apartheid-supporters, but they are all South Africans.

The phrase used twice in Parliament by Finance Minister Dönges that in the Republic "five million hearts beat as one" was not lost upon those Indian and Coloured businessmen who can count only $3\frac{1}{2}$ million whites and $1\frac{1}{2}$ million of their combined ethnic groups.

This is not the place to delineate the tremendous surge of Afrikaans business as exemplified in possibly the world's most important cigarette concern. Dr. Anton Rupert's Rembrandt Corporation has its headquarters in the lovely old university village of Stellenbosch in the Cape, and factories stretch from Canada to Malaysia, Europe, Rhodesia and South Africa. We mention Anton Rupert particularly because he does not have the ear of government when it comes to foreign policy. The frequent assumption abroad, and even in South Africa, that any and all prominent Afrikaners are next to the government is highly erroneous. For example, the Prime Minister apparently blocked Dr. Rupert's appointment as titular head of the new Port Elizabeth University. Rupert's ideas, such as "integrated" Coloured and White corporation boards and Afrikaner investment in the Transkei, make him far from acceptable in inner National Party circles. It is ludicrous to suggest that he is a "fringe Afrikaner," as one epithet from the "right" puts it, but neither is he the heart of Afrikanerdom, as some critics from the "left" would say.

If we consider other businessmen, both in and out of the much overestimated *Broederbond*, whose political views are closer to those of the Prime Minister, and whose economic complaints have some weight, we find their influence is rather strictly limited to economic affairs. Businessmen who have trade with, and need to travel in, various African states where South African goods are technically banned and South Africans unwelcome, have been given permission to carry other passports such as British, German and so on, to which they were legally entitled before a South African ruling against dual passports.

The South Africa Foundation is composed of leading South African white businessmen from the middle right of the National Party to the middle left of the Progressives, with the bulk of them conservative United Party corporation presidents. Its aim has been to improve the image of South Africa abroad, and large sums have been spent, especially in Germany and the United Kingdom, with marked success in those countries. Efforts are also being rewarded in other European countries, but virtually nothing has been done in the United States. The first visit of U.S. industrial statesman Clarence Randall and the odd southern editor are the extent of the feeble U.S. program.

The men around the Chairman, Sir Francis de Guingand (Montgomery's Chief of Staff), are too politically diverse to either support or reject specific government programs. Indeed, it is one of their principles not to do so. But, at a distance, they are a major asset to the government. Although the Foundation would be the first to deny it, the

truth is, that along with the genuine and patriotic desire to improve South Africa's foreign reputation, Foundation leaders have a second string to their bow. Once successful in aiding their country, these leaders, who are for the most part United Party oriented, might then have substantial influence in modifying certain internal policies which they see as harmful to South Africa abroad, not only affecting their profits, but potentially threatening the existence of the white oligarchy.

Dr. Verwoerd is far too shrewd to be taken in by such an obvious tactic. While praising the South African Foundation, he has kept it at arm's length and particularly distant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To be sure, when the local committee in Germany sends a prominent editor or industrialist to South Africa, the Foreign Minister will by all means receive him, and the Prime Minister may participate. But no promises are made, and direct advice is not welcome. The Foundation has a role, but considering the great stature of its board and the amount of money it has spent, its voice is quite a minor one.

It may be that the preceding paragraph underrated the influence of the South Africa Foundation and of its head, Sir Francis de Guingand. Such a distinguished American as Clarence Randall, whose own domestic record in race relations is impeccable, and who was President Eisenhower's choice to negotiate with President Nkrumah, believes the Foundation is an influential, important, and positive force on the South African scene.

In mentioning Afrikaans businessmen who are very

much *persona grata* with the government, it would be an error to attribute unethical influence to them. The South African civil service is exceptionally honest and graft-free by world standards. Even after 16 years of rule by the National Party, there is far less influence-peddling and graft than takes place in even the more respectable parts of American governmental life. A Sherman Adams or a Bobby Baker case is possible, but it would be a major exception. This points up the fact that the sharp cleavage between the official and the unofficial side of South African life is not materially breached just because of close Afrikaner Nationalist ties.

Despite the general probity of South African officialdom—at least compared with the United States—one must note that there are significant differences on the whole conflict of interest issue. A chart of the business directorships of National Party M.P.'s is an amazing web. Furthermore, if you correlate this with their business ties before entering Parliament, you can only conclude that their business sagacity has been sharply upgraded in Parliament. There is nothing like the "watch dog" attitude some of the U.S. press adopts when it comes to legislators introducing or supporting legislation where final passage would mean their personal gain. The same pattern was true when the United Party was in power. These comments are not meant to disparage what is common practice in the Republic as it is in the great majority of countries throughout the world, but to suggest that there are significant channels through the

business/legislative world which have a potential to bear on the formation of South African foreign policy.

The most important business influence at the top levels of the South African government is what can be loosely termed the *Federale-Sanlam-Bonuskor* group. Actually, a host of companies are intertwined as the original groups grew under the shrewd organizing ability of M. S. Louw. Today one should note that the head of General Mining (which has absorbed *Federale Mynbou*) is Thomas F. Muller, the able brother of Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller. Ambassador in London Carel de Wet, a medical doctor before he entered politics, is a director of the group's medical supply company. Economics Minister Diederichs has close ties, as does Minister Maree. Actually, one of the most influential men is the Deputy Chairman but main mover of *Federale Volksbeleggings*, C. Hendrik Brink. From time to time he has, for example, reportedly discussed U.S.-South African foreign policy with Prime Minister Verwoerd and with Defense Minister Fouché. It is also significant that the former managing director of *Die Nasionale Pers* (publisher of *Die Burger* in Cape Town) became a director of *Federale* in late 1964.

One direct consequence of foreign arms boycotts and threats against South Africa has been a boom in the local arms industry. While much of the business has gone to long-established and qualified "English" firms, and many thousands of Africans have benefited from higher wages and, in specific cases, exemptions from certain racial restrictions

on their occupations, the Afrikaner companies have also had a wedge of the new pie. For example, *Bonuskor* has been given the new aircraft factory, the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa.

It would be an anachronistic oversimplification to say that because the great bulk of successful Afrikaner corporations were started in the Cape, therefore Afrikaner business is a "liberal" influence in foreign policy. Many of the top executives in these "Cape" organizations are, like Thomas Muller, born and bred Transvalers, or like *Federale's* Managing Director, Cornelis Human, Free Staters. However, a number of them have served periods of duty in Cape Town and its somewhat milder political climate may well have modified the "harsh views" so often assumed as a product of the Transvaal *platteland*. In late 1964 there was an unsuccessful but concerted effort to block the election of "Tom" Muller as President of the *Handelsinstituut* because he was "too liberal."

But despite the intricate interweaving of personalities and positions and also the personal friendships of many of these somewhat "liberal" (but not to the Rupert or Marais degree) businessmen with the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet, it would be an error to attribute even to them much positive role in the direct formation of South African foreign policy. On conditions of trade and of finance, they feel free and natural to bring up their views over a brandy and water. But the line between officialdom and the general leadership of the Afrikaner people retains a "stiff" quality

which would be inconceivable in the more convivial "poli-ticking" atmosphere of, say, the LBJ Ranch.

One of the few key executives of the many large semi-government organizations who can speak with some force with the Prime Minister is Dr. H. J. van Eck, who holds many directorships, and is one of the great economic developers of the world. Van Eck is not particularly politically conscious, but on a month-long visit to Japan in 1964 (where a ship was named after his wife), he was pressed politically by the Japanese. According to Japanese sources, he asked for an increase in the already booming trade between Japan and South Africa. This exchange ranges from millions of dollars worth of iron ore which has begun to move to Japan, to thousands of Japanese transistor radios, trucks and other hardware sold in the Republic.

The Japanese say that besides discouraging Dr. van Eck about an increase in trade, they even cast doubt on their ability to maintain the present level of mutually profitable trade because of foreign political pressure on Japan from the Afro-Asian bloc. This friendly but deadly serious plea by the Japanese that South Africa must do something to improve its international image was conveyed to Prime Minister Verwoerd.

A direct response to the best interests of the business community—and of the country's economic health—was the formal classification of Japanese as being "white" under Republican law. The tremendous boom in South African-Japanese trade brought its own pressures to bear.

Still on a business level, but shifting 180 degrees from government corporation to the largest capitalistic enterprise in Africa, we come to the Anglo American Corporation, which is, of course, neither Anglo nor American. Chairman Harry Oppenheimer is the most powerful businessman in South Africa and Zambia. He also plays a key role in the De Beers Diamond organization in Tanganyika (the Williamson mine, so productive of essential foreign exchange), Sierra Leone and even Ghana (although the latter has formally withdrawn from the international marketing cartel). Anglo American has a new office in New York and is a very powerful factor in London, as well as across the sub-Sahara.

Although Harry Oppenheimer was a sharp and liberal United Party M.P. and the chief financial backer of the Progressive (votes for all primary school graduates irrespective of race) Party, there can scarcely be constant war between Anglo American and the government. Their economic embrace may be devoid of love, but is nonetheless muscular.

At the Treasury level there is no friction. Both sides are correct, and Anglo American has never been denied the foreign exchange it may want for operations elsewhere, including hostile African states.

Oppenheimer's young daughter, Mary, is concerned with the family charities. She was personally able to reverse a negative decision by the Interior Department recently, to secure a passport for a young African physics graduate of Fort Hare to attend Oxford on an Oppenheimer grant.

At the foreign policy level, the Johannesburg *Sunday*

Times called upon the government to ask Oppenheimer's help in arranging an exchange of diplomatic representatives with Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda. It was perhaps unrealistic to be so informal and out in the open. Oppenheimer and his many able aides have a truly intimate grasp of Zambian affairs and are a powerful internal factor in the new country. But this expertise is not brought to bear for South Africa on a month-to-month basis.

It has been asserted that several times a year the Anglo American ruler and the Prime Minister spend an evening alone together. This is highly unlikely. The reaction against disclosure of such a meeting would be strongest against the Prime Minister. One has only to cast back in South African history to the private talks between Abe Bailey and General Hertzog. Disclosure of this information reacted strongly against Hertzog among his supporters, and contributed to his eventual downfall. From intermediaries on the business side through Economic Affairs Minister Diederichs, some blunt economic facts may be brought to bear on foreign policy with effect. But Oppenheimer's political views on domestic affairs are firmly rejected.

In a broad sense, some acceptable Afrikaner businessmen and, as an individual, Harry Oppenheimer, do play a role in the shaping of foreign policy, especially when economics are involved. But this influence is far less than it would be in the United States.

Provincialism

In addition to stereotypic "isolationist Middle West" and the "internationalist East," there are significant regional differences on foreign policy, including tariffs, within the

United States. What comparable differences are there in South Africa?

Broadly speaking, the differences are not as great within the ranks of the dominant National Party. Only two provinces are significant, the Transvaal and the Cape. Predominantly English-speaking Natal does not have the political strength to play a major role. For a time the Nationalists were not enthusiastic about building up Durban as South Africa's major port. It was foreign territory, where the man who spoke Afrikaans was held up to derision as a country cousin, or an alien in his own country. But all this has changed. Even street signs are in both official languages. Afrikaners now predominate in the hotel bookings at the south coast holiday resort town of Margate. Their political dominance on a national basis has long since led Afrikaner ministers to promote whatever they felt was best for South Africa as a whole. Durban is the best harbor, and Natal has the best economic potential, especially in vital water resources, in all of South Africa. The special crop of sugar is no less cared for internationally because it is "English-owned" than the export mealies of the Transvaal Boer. The National Party no longer contents itself with holding a few northern Natal seats, but it has planned to double the number of candidates' seats, including such former exclusively "English" preserves as Ixopo and Zululand, for the 1965 provincial election. Natal has different, more pro-British views, and voted against the Republic in 1961, but it does not have a major role in foreign policy making.

South West Africa is more distinctive but no more in-

fluent. The German-speaking community is catered for, to some extent, but they have no well-organized views on foreign policy. Windhoek is in some ways the most cosmopolitan city in South Africa, but this has derived in the past from special import allocations for South West above those allowed to other provinces. Also detracting from South West's possible influence, is the fact that the Afrikaans people in the territory are considered rather rough pioneers by Afrikaners as a whole, and few Southwesterners hold prominent national positions.

The Orange Free State is a minor factor in national politics and cannot be said to have a distinctive outlook on foreign policy. Local issues such as the periodic Basuto claim to what they refer to as the "conquered territories" across the Caledon River cause a sharp reaction among white farmers who would be affected, but this has always blown over quickly in the past.

Any significant provincial tug of war on foreign policy within Nationalist ranks comes between the Transvalers and the "Kapenaars," and between the Transvaal and the Western Province. This has become a most unequal struggle on paper. The Cape is steadily losing parliamentary seats as the white population booms in the Witwatersrand, in the Free State Gold Fields and in industrializing Natal. The economic weight has always been centered on Johannesburg, and this concentration is growing. About all the Western Province brings to the struggle are ideas backed by an historical tradition.

Regional differences have arisen, but they are easy to

overemphasize. The United Party made a strong appeal to the pocketbooks of Afrikaner fruit exporters and wine makers at the time of leaving the Commonwealth and the vote on the Republic. The Cape was told that it was being asked to sacrifice export sales for the political dreams of the Transvaal. The referendum margin in the Cape was much less than in the Transvaal or the Free State, but this issue has died away.

At the time of shift from the so-called "soft line" on the position of the Coloured people to the "hard line," and the Prime Minister's famous "granite wall" speech, Cape Nationalists tried to promote the line that a policy of eventual integration with the Coloured people would yield South Africa great benefits overseas from some countries. *Die Burger* tried various variations of this foreign policy theme, but eventually had to admit defeat in theory. The development of the present trend of absorbing thousands of lighter-skinned Coloured people by simply reclassifying them as European, has not been publicized by the State Information Service as an example of racial moderation, and, in fact, of integration of this westernized minority.

A prominent Cape Nationalist, interested in foreign affairs, predicts that the Cape will play a special role when it comes to the acceptance of dark-skinned ambassadors from other countries. However, it is a striking but little-noted fact that whereas the Transkei lies within the Cape Province, it is the Transvaal which has provided all the ideas and drive for its development. At secret meetings in Pretoria on the development of the Transkei, the Cape never

had more than one or two representatives. This reflects, in part, a feeling that the Transvalers will tackle the "Bantu problem" and that the Cape should deal with the "Coloured problem." That view again emphasizes that, in these intellectual matters, it is the Western Province which is really meant as the "Cape" and not the predominantly African Eastern Province centered on Port Elizabeth, or "Border" centered on East London.

Although potential differences in approach to foreign policy are lessened by the strength of outside pressures on South Africa, the split between the Western Province and the Transvaal has scarcely been deeper than today. While it would appear that the Transvaal is all powerful—the candidacy of the Cape leader of the National Party, Eben Dönges, for Prime Minister was easily turned back by Dr. Verwoerd's supporters—there is a certain frustration in the Transvaal. This starts with little things such as an attempt to move the headquarters of the South African Association of Arts from Cape Town to Pretoria. It includes the cultural vigor of Afrikaans writing in the south, including the "Sestigers" (men of the sixties), matched by the movement of SABRA (South African Bureau of Racial Affairs) from Stellenbosch to Pretoria, and the Anti-Communist Congress in the north. Even though such *Sestigers* as Brink and Le Roux are Transvaler and Free Stater respectively, the affiliation in their case, as in other groups, seems to be to an ideal of the Western Cape, even though that historical region is sometimes lacking in both drive and personalities.

In 1964, feeling rose extraordinarily high on the rugby

field where Northern Transvaal traditionally reckons that the dominance of Western Province players on national Springbok teams is unwarranted. After Northern Transvaal shellacked W.P. in a friendly match, 30-3, the cry became a deep-throated shout with distinct political overtones, and was only stilled when Western Province won the crucial league game by a decisive margin.

But where the rivalry goes really deep is among Afrikaans businessmen. While it is true that the great industrial complex of the Witwatersrand completely overshadows the Cape, this is not true of Afrikaner businessmen in the Transvaal over their Cape brothers. The most successful Afrikaner business enterprises are Cape-managed. One of the few exceptions is *Volkskas*. For years it was truly the "people's bank" of the Afrikaners and a proud achievement of the Transvalers. But the rocketing rise of Jan Marais' Trust Bank not only jarred *Volkskas* but also the "English" banks as well. Most unusually, Marais began with a savings and loan bank, and moved to commercial banking without giving up the legal advantages of a savings bank.

The reaction in some Transvaal circles has been to attack Marais on all sides as "liberalistic" and to cast aspersions on his association with the South African Foundation and internationalism generally. This is similar to the attacks in the Transvaal on Anton Rupert's world-wide organization run from Stellenbosch in the Cape.

All this is in turn reflected on differences in the Afrikaans press. During Mr. Strijdom's tenure as Prime Minis-

ter, *Die Nasionale Pers* (which publishes *Die Burger* in Cape Town) told him that they were starting a pro-government Sunday paper in the Transvaal. The only Sunday Afrikaans paper was the then independent *Dagbreek en Sondagnuus*, one half of whose shares were controlled by an English-speaking person. The Transvalers reacted sharply to this announcement. A Church delegation flew down to Cape Town to oppose a new Afrikaans Sunday paper on religious grounds. Meanwhile, a whirlwind campaign in the Transvaal *platteland* raised almost half a million dollars for a group headed by Mr. Strijdom to buy out *Dagbreek* and to publish it in its present form as a Nationalist paper.

To conclude on provincialism in foreign policy, only the Cape and the Transvaal are significant, and the generally "harder" line of the latter is dominant. The basis for a sharp regional difference does exist, but one would emphasize that overall South African foreign policy is not presently subject to major provincial differences of interpretation.

Lack of Contact

Nearly all of the diplomatic missions to South Africa complain that they cannot get to know South African officials as individuals. There are golfing and hunting exceptions, but the general rule is to keep the distance. This is easier to understand when it affects diplomats of countries who are sharply critical of South Africa, such as Sweden or the United States, but it also applies to small countries such as

Austria, with whom South Africa has a very favorable balance of trade, and where there is little anti-South African criticism in the home press.

France, a principal source of arms for South Africa, is critically important to South Africa and could be of immense help. Washington and London find France the least "controllable" major western nation. It is widely believed in informed circles that President de Gaulle has given orders for greater French cooperation and assistance. However, the French diplomats have dropped comments that it is far from easy to break through a certain reserve (suspicion?) to really do much so far.

Of course, a certain number of dinner invitations are accepted by government officials or prominent Nationalists, but a formal embassy dinner can take place with precious little real conversation. Even Sir John Maud, for five years British High Commissioner/Ambassador to Pretoria, has commented on how little serious conversation he had with South African officials until the end of his tour.

This reserve is not so much cold rigidity on the part of Afrikaners as it is their concept of diplomacy. And, added to this, are the many attractive ways for them to spend their time with their own South African friends in the excellent climate of Pretoria.

One sound reason for a lack of more contact, especially between Nationalist members of Parliament, and foreign diplomats and visitors, was pointed out by one of the ablest Cape backbenchers when he said: "It is one thing to speak fluently in Afrikaans in the house, to be able to read English

newspapers with ease, and to conduct the ordinary business of living in English. But it is something else if you are thoroughly Afrikaans and do not speak English at home, to express yourself fluently on difficult subjects to highly intelligent foreigners." This explains why you will sometimes find a Nationalist M.P. in a gathering who has no difficulty in following the conversation, but who is somewhat reticent about articulating his own views.

With this apprehension, he may shun many contacts with English-speaking diplomats or visitors. In other instances, even though he is able to talk professionally with them, his wife's lack of fluency might bar him from inviting someone home or accepting a social invitation. Because all Afrikaners of this prominence do speak English, and because it is a common medium of expression in South Africa, there is all the more reason to be uncertain if one isn't fluent.

An Afrikaner newspaper editor, when privately discussing South Africans' relations with the rest of the world, came back again and again to the Afrikaner's sense of inferiority in some fields. Up until recently, even the Middle Western American farmer shared a similar concern that his people would be "outslickered" by those "fellers" in Europe. The editor did not share these feelings, but constantly encounters them in discussions of foreign affairs among educated Afrikaners.

When this is added to the sense of being besieged ever since 1948, the emotional wall blocking effective communication grows high. There is no doubt that the widespread feeling among Afrikaners that they are in a war of attri-

tion has stifled a tremendous amount of internal differences over ways and means, and is a prime reason for the lack of contact between Afrikaners and diplomats at all levels.

Feedback Institutions and Programs

The relatively unified and uncomplicated process of forming South African foreign policy derives in part from the absence of feedback from South Africans abroad. This phenomenon is different from the internal role which may be played by newspapers, universities, business, and churches. For example, the lack of foreign correspondents may mean a lack of information, but it also means that no clique (good or bad) develops from an overseas vantage point. The influence of half a dozen correspondents in Saigon on American thinking has no parallel in the Republic.

The direct, intense involvement in foreign areas by over one hundred American universities, many with foreign branches and contracts, creates a definite lobby. The reaction from government bodies such as the Peace Corps, and its alumni and friends across the U.S., is a force. Far more American companies are involved in operations abroad, even though exports are far less important to the United States than they are to South Africa. Philanthropic foundations undergird many activities and some have a vested interest in U.S. policy in various parts of the world. American churches also take a stand on foreign involvement, with definite reactions from inside the United States on foreign policy.

Comparable examples from South Africa are rare. When

the N.G. Church withdrew from Nigeria and then from Nyasaland in the 1950's, it became an issue in foreign policy in both instances. The South African Mutual Insurance Company pulled back in East Africa, as have other Republican firms. The continued involvement of Anglo American in Central and East Africa, and of the Rembrandt Group in many countries including Malaysia and Japan is an exception to the pattern of withdrawal from "hot spots."

These facts sum up that, compared with the U.S., Great Britain, or Holland, there are relatively few groups within South Africa which might—for good or ill—exert pressure on the formation of policy. The fact that the South African government in general, and Prime Minister Verwoerd in particular, are strong in their reactions against pressure groups, especially from outside Afrikaner nationalism, means that the rough and tumble lobbying which features so much policy making in Washington simply does not exist in Pretoria.

The lack of feedback from South Africans and institutions abroad means that what might be termed the Pretorian Guard is protected from sometimes irrational and emotional pressure groups. But at the same time, it is deprived of independent, thoughtful analyses of possible alternatives for South African policies, as conceived by South Africans or their institutions in foreign areas.

For Americans, there is a partial analogy in the way extremely deep differences and literal hates towards President Franklin D. Roosevelt were buried by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Many a critic holds his tongue if he feels, in

a wartime situation, that legitimate criticism will be of comfort to the enemy or even considered as bordering on treason by his peers. This restraint has a most unhealthy influence on any body politic in need of vigorous debate and radical change. This does not mean that radical change does not occur, but instead that it must always be under the guise of no change. Piet Cillié, *Die Burger's* editor, often takes up the theme of Afrikaner nationalists being the "real radicals" in South Africa, and in some ways Dr. Verwoerd is most willing to plan carefully radical departures from traditional white South African stereotypes. But the "lager mentality," as the English language press sometimes dubs it, is certainly enhanced by the sense of national peril, while vigorous and radical debate is sacrificed.

A major feedback involves the exchange of persons. Five major organizations in this field are: The U.S.-South African Leader Exchange Program, the U.S. State Department with its leader grants, the South African Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, and the American Field Service Exchange.

The last-mentioned program concentrates upon young people in the last years of high school. It is American stimulated and, unofficially, has the result of "brainwashing" young South Africans who come to the United States at the impressionable age of 16 or so, and of promoting liberal ideas within the Republic. Because its South African adult connections are largely among the upper-class English-speaking and anti-government section of the white community, most of the South Africans going abroad are anti-

government—*all are white*—and most of the young people going to South Africa are placed in anti-government white homes. Occasionally an Afrikaner and pro-government student will be sent abroad but on a number of occasions the steady pressure exerted in the United States by host parents and others has boomeranged and actually moved the young person to the political right a year or so after his or her return to the Republic. The program is under great suspicion in Afrikaner circles, and its continued existence is in jeopardy.

The program of the Carnegie Corporation has made a notable contribution to South Africa across several decades. It concentrates upon university people and has enabled a substantial number of South Africans to acquire greater professional skills in the United States as well as some understanding of the complexities of the U.S. Some distinguished Americans have gone to South Africa, again with a professional emphasis, but the major traffic has been towards the United States. The program has operated without racial distinctions and with relatively little friction, although the refusal by the South African government of a passport to a Cape Town University lecturer, an African, in the early sixties, placed a strain on the program. Carnegie fellows within the Republic have ranged from staunchly pro-government to strongly liberal. Without doubt the program has contributed to greater understanding. Few of the South African grantees are in positions affecting the making of South African policy, but some are on the fringe.

U.S. State Department exchangeees have diminished sharp-

ly in numbers since 1962—some of them apparently traded off for more travel grants to “black” Africa. Again, the range has covered all races and a wide political spectrum.

The U.S.-South African Leader Exchange Program has exchanged over 120 individuals in recent years, and has been the major institution operating in this field. The occasional visits under this program of distinguished American Negroes to South Africa have been notable for their impact both on the travelers and upon their white, black and brown hosts. But feedback regarding foreign policy is greatest in regard to the South Africans exchanged. Exchangees have included several Coloured poets, government officials, African social workers, many businessmen of all races, a number of Dutch Reformed and other protestant ministers, numerous young journalists (mostly as Associate Nieman Fellows at Harvard), not to mention scientists, professors, etc.

Criticism of this program, entirely financed from foundation, corporate and private contributions in both the U.S. and South Africa, has been fairly steady from two sources. On the right of the National Party in the Republic the accusation has been repeatedly leveled that the whole program is an attempt to brainwash South Africans and to expose them only to “liberal” influences in the United States with the object of influencing policy. Criticism has also been voiced that visitors to South Africa are predominantly “liberal,” although the renowned professor, Clinton Rossiter of Cornell, made the largest impact with his addresses on federalism and other forms of political organization. On

the other side, the second source of sharp and even bitter criticism has been from very strongly anti-South African groups in the United States, who accuse the program of "playing ball" with "diehard segregationists" and of making it appear that South Africa, even if there are minor disagreements, is a more or less respectable country. From time to time the first set of accusations have contributed to deep suspicion on the part of the South African government as to the purpose of the whole private exchange venture. Conversely, the suggestion has been advanced in the United States that because of the power of the South Africans to grant or deny visas to visitors or passports to its own citizens, the purported free exchange of people becomes a fraud.

Certainly there are members of the American half of the Management Committee who see the whole program as an attempt to help white South Africa "see the light" and to proceed with full integration. Certainly there are members of the South African half of the Committee who see the program as a way of educating visiting Americans as to the "true facts" of South Africa, or of sending "good" South Africans to promote South African ideas in the U.S. Neither viewpoint has yet to dominate the overall board. It is striking that the South African half of the Management Committee contains a broader cross-section of political views than any other "board" or "committee" in South Africa. It has included the head of the *Broederbond*, the head of the Methodist Church, the Assistant Director of the Institute of Race Relations, and a number of Nationalists and anti-

Nationalists—both English-and Afrikaans-speaking—who would rarely come into association or general dialogue. The impact upon foreign policy has not been direct, but probably significant. The long series of articles in *Die Burger* in 1963-64, by its able foreign editor J. J. J. Scholtz (an exchangee) delineated the American scene, not always in terms flattering to the Americans, in a way that no Afrikaans-medium newspaper had ever spotlighted the U.S.

The South African Foundation is discussed as an arm of the business community, but the feedback from its efforts in behalf of white South Africa generally, and quite often directly in support of some particular aspects of government policy, has been the major counter to foreign activities—and here we include exchange efforts by most of the major nations of Europe—to put across a point of view in the Republic.

The “feedback” of the South African Foundation is supposed to be in foreign countries, but there is no doubt that when the foreign visitors—normally selected because they *may be inclined* to support South Africa in general but not in detail—ask pertinent and probing questions for which there are not very good answers, a pressure does build up to make such internal changes as may be necessary and broadly consistent with government policy, so that the “South African Case” is more palatable, rational and supportable by the distinguished foreign visitors on their return to their home countries.

It is perhaps due to the general lack of foreign policy discussion within the Republic that the feedback from ex-

change programs can exercise a significant influence in the medium run, and this is perhaps why the government in general and Prime Minister Verwoerd specifically, looks at all of the programs with a suspicious eye from time to time.

There is no "alumni" association of participants from any of the exchange programs, but there is an "old boy" net built up as people are handed on from city to city, that eventually forms an unofficial web of people with common interests. Any direct impact on foreign policy, however, has been limited and individual, but is no less important than the lack of impact we have found in a variety of South African institutions.

The Legislature

In 1964 Senator Fulbright, as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, played an important role in the formulation of policy, without necessarily being in full agreement with the State Department. This latter point is a difficult one for almost all foreign observers of the U.S. to place in perspective. Similarly, the views of Senator Dirksen on foreign policy determine in a highly practical day-to-day fashion, how general types of legislation affecting foreign policy will be handled by Congress. There are many others whose views in a South African crisis, for instance, could be heard in Congress. The growing contribution of the permanent Senate and House staffs is not to be overlooked.

This pattern is alien to South Africa. The only area of real consultation between government and official opposi-

tion (and excluding all others) has been on South West Africa. Even here, what exists rests on personal agreements between Dr. Verwoerd and Sir de Villiers Graaff. These are minimal. "Div" Graaff was not happy when the Prime Minister introduced the whole Odendaal Report without consultation. The leader of the Opposition feels that his pulling punches on South West requires prior consultation on major government moves as a *quid pro quo*.

The United Party is naturally cautious in not hurting South Africa on the South West case. Indeed, when M.P. "Japie" Basson followed his praise of the government's economic efforts in South West with a stinging criticism of the political arrangements, attempts were made by some Nationalists to question his loyalty and patriotism.

Among the Parliamentary Opposition, Marais Steyn, a key United Party front-bencher—No. 2 in the U.P.—is probably the only man who could be considered a specialist on some aspect of American life. Steyn has a thorough knowledge of the American Constitution and keeps abreast of trends affecting its application. Others, notably Sir de Villiers, have travelled in the States and have a general grasp of its politics without attempting to go into depth. But this Opposition experience, limited as it is, is not really utilized in forming South African policy. The foreign policy debates are infrequent and rarely productive from opposition benches. The main Opposition thrust is that Nationalist domestic policy is a great handicap to better foreign relations.

Within the ranks of the National Party M.P.'s, individual

views count for less. There are few specialists on foreign policy, and none on the United States. There is a Nationalist foreign policy information group which meets regularly in session and occasionally hears the views of outside speakers, but its direct influence on government policy is distinctly minor. M.P. Fritz Steyn makes an occasional sally and is tipped from time to time as an important M.P. in this field. A distinguished British churchman, genuinely interested in understanding the Nationalist position, was referred to Steyn as a key figure. On South West Africa, the M.P.'s from the territory have more to say. Paul van der Merwe (M.P. for Middelrand) is a former newspaper editor and a keen student of foreign affairs, with a recent M.A. and a Ph.D. in prospect. He has been given a special office and a role in South West and foreign policy. His Excellency Carel de Wet, Ambassador to Great Britain, was a fairly active M.P. in Parliament. He visited some parts of Africa and made a number of speeches on Africa in the later period of Eric Louw's ministership of foreign affairs.

The National Party M.P.'s in the legislature represent its heart. This is, in part, a reflection of the presence of so many former party organizers in Parliament. Nearly one-third of the National Party M.P.'s have held paid positions within the party, and a majority of the National M.P.'s are dependent upon the party and its appointments for their livelihood. The day of the rich farmer being a part-time legislator has given way to the professional politician being a part-time farmer (for status and tax savings) and company director (for income).

In contrast to the Republican Party in the U.S., or the Conservative Party in Great Britain, the Nationalists have few important contributors and power-movers behind the scenes. Those that do exist bring pressure to bear only on the domestic scene. They do not attempt to deal with foreign affairs and, unlike some other countries, there is not, as we have said, a lobby for particular countries inside government and party circles.

In an atypical action, Dr. C. F. Albertyn, Chairman of the Porterville branch of the National Party and a prominent publisher, rose at a Cape Party Congress to move that South Africa withdraw from the United Nations. But, despite then Minister Eric Louw's antipathy for that international organization, Mr. Louw squashed this effort to launch a foreign policy motion.

Many M.P.s are most influential in non-parliamentary groups because the tight rule of the whips in South African practice almost rules out open shifts.

The power exercised behind the scenes by the F.A.K. (a cultural organization binding Afrikaans groups together) and other Afrikaner groups, including the *Broederbond*, is not particularly significant on the foreign policy level. To be sure, an appearance of weakness, vacillation, or capitulation calls forth a strong reaction. There is a certain xenophobia among the right wing of the National Party which sees nearly all foreign influence as dangerous, and is on guard against it. But this is blown up and ridiculed most inaccurately at times by the sometimes vituperatively anti-government English press.

Among the few people whose views are important outside of the regular machinery are: Piet Koornhof, the extremely able (Oxford Ph.D. in anthropology), personable, and modest secretary of F.A.K.; Professor P. F. D. Weiss, head of the *Afrika Instituut* in Pretoria; Piet Meyer, head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation; and the Administrator of South West Africa, Wentzel C. du Plessis, who spent four years as South African Ambassador in Washington. Meyer, for example, was allowed to visit Dr. Verwoerd in the hospital after the nearly successful attempt at assassination, before any cabinet minister.

The Cabinet

Foreign policy is discussed fully at cabinet level. Every important step is brought up for consideration, barring an emergency when a cabinet meeting is not feasible, as in the general vacation period after the close of a parliamentary session. The discussion is strongly led by the Prime Minister. Dr. Hilgard Muller, the Foreign Minister, makes numerous factual statements and presents his own views, nearly always in close harmony with Dr. Verwoerd.

"Jim" Fouché, by nature of his Defense portfolio, is often in the discussion. His invariably moderate views and general conviction that, while South Africa requires a strong defense, the real fight is on a political and economic level, means that there is no mailed fist defiantly pounding the cabinet room table. His great success in strengthening the armed forces, and especially in raising their *esprit de corps* after the morale-depressing regime of ward politics by his

predecessors, have brought him great respect. Finance Minister Dönges plays a natural part in foreign relations, but does not express some of the purely political judgments he feels along moderate lines. Paul Sauer, who left the cabinet for reasons of health in July, 1964, often spoke up. Now that he is remaining an M.P., but no longer a minister or leader of the House, he may well have some sapient observations to make in parliamentary debate.

Among those who might not be expected to speak up is Minister Maree, whose main concern is with the Indian community and Bantu education. His comments on foreign affairs are deemed thoughtful by his ministerial colleagues.

Two of the strong men in the cabinet, Justice Minister Vorster, and Interior Minister de Klerk, play a far greater role in domestic politics than in foreign affairs. Visas come under Minister de Klerk, which accounts for occasional friction between his department and both Foreign Affairs and Information. The Information Minister, Frank Waring, owes his seat at the table primarily to his English background, and long-held conservative political views.

The Secretary of the State Information Service, Brand Fourie, carries as much weight as anyone not at the apex of policy-making. Fourie was an exceptionally able ambassador to the United Nations, where he made many personal friends, despite the intense unpopularity of his diplomatic case. Subsequently, he headed up African Affairs in the Foreign Service, a critical role in view of the South African difficulty in dealing with the great majority of African states. Both Fourie's experience in New York and his

judgment are respected by the Prime Minister. Dr. Verwoerd has a strong preference for highly intelligent and able people around him, a fact often overlooked because, out of shrewd political calculation, he does suffer some truly unperceptive if not incompetent people, and when political necessity dictates, will give them a diplomatic task. Fourie is respected, yet he might well be the first to say that his tenure at the United Nations fails to give him a thorough insight into the United States as a whole.

The Prime Minister

If one were to list the most important people making foreign policy, the names might well run:

1. Dr. Verwoerd. 2. Dr. Verwoerd. 3. Dr. Verwoerd. 4. Foreign Minister Muller. 5. The Cabinet, and 6. Secretary G. P. Jooste, Brand Fourie, Donald Sole, and one or two other professionals.

If policy is so largely made by such a minimum of people with the overwhelming importance of the Prime Minister, one may well ask: What is their intake of raw or digested information on which to make decisions? The Prime Minister attends to a tremendous amount of detail. Perhaps a third of his time is given to party political matters—much reduced from when he first assumed the premiership. One wonders whether he can give 5 or 10% of his time to give to foreign matters? If the United States is only one of many countries, how does he form his judgments on the U.S.? He is an avid reader (recently Dutch editions of *Julius Caesar* have been on his night table), but not quite a Harry

Truman. Does he have time to read a book a year about the United States? It is doubtful. Even for an intellectually brilliant man, Dr. Verwoerd must find the complexities and inconsistencies of the United States difficult to unravel accurately. Given good reports which do not play up some aspects unduly, he might well have a good grasp. But the accurate balance of his intake is very much in doubt, and any imbalance is accentuated by the limited intake.

Today the Prime Minister is far more positive in foreign affairs statements than when Foreign Minister Eric Louw played a Dulles-like role. On South West Africa, the Prime Minister has had innumerable meetings with some of South Africa's first-class brains.

These are men such as David de Villiers, M. Muller, Judge Theo van Wyk (currently South African Judge at the World Court case), Verloren van Themaat and other superb lawyers. They have been forced to take social, economic, and political facts into account, and their talks with the P.M. have shed much new light on his understanding. The far-reaching Odendaal Report on South West is an acknowledgement that, once the Prime Minister looked carefully at South West, he saw that the status quo must be changed, and quickly. The much-praised economic side of the change was easier than the less thought-out political side with its international dynamite. The Prime Minister's focus on South West was noticeably sharpened by Brand Fourie after the Ambassador accompanied Ambassador Carpio in the ill-starred United Nations inspection.

On the economic/political side, it is worth noting how

much closer to the Prime Minister is Dr. H. J. Van Eck in recent years. D. H. "Hennie" Steyn of the Reserve Bank also has the Prime Minister's economic ear with political overtones. The correct prediction that South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth would not be an economic disaster, boosted the stock of Harvard-educated economist Dr. David Maree.

This essay does not really penetrate into the important area of the Prime Minister's personal friends or those individuals he talks to at length in private. Where the United States is concerned, there is little informal communication with the American Ambassador. This has been true ever since Dr. Verwoerd took office. Mr. Satterthwaite's position of "friendly aloofness" might also characterize that of the Prime Minister. Dr. Verwoerd did have a brief but penetrating conversation with Clarence Randall in a lull during a dinner party (one of the few times Dr. Verwoerd has accepted an American invitation), and he talks with a few visiting Americans. Newsmen are generally ignored, causing some hard feelings, especially among the distinguished European correspondents.

Lewis Douglas, former U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, talked at leisure for almost two hours with the Prime Minister in mid-1964, a continuation of annual visits by this widely-experienced American businessman. The Prime Minister will listen to Douglas, yet one must remember that when someone "talked to" the Prime Minister, this generally means for South Africans or foreigners that the Prime Minister did most of the talking.

Dr. Verwoerd does look at some letters written by Americans, and has been known to read a few carefully, and to comment on them to colleagues. While Dr. Verwoerd has written a few lengthy replies to Americans, there has been nothing like Prime Minister D. F. Malan's widely published letter to a Dutch Reformed minister in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Excerpts of articles about South Africa, especially when they are favorable, are passed on to him by a variety of people, and generally read in proportion to the person's importance.

One of the small unpublicized dramas of the Kennedy Administration was the decision not to respond favorably to Prime Minister Verwoerd's private proposal that the South African premier visit President Kennedy in Washington. Dr. Verwoerd was not pleased with the decision. There is some question as to how well he was briefed on the prevailing mood of the United States after the Kennedy inauguration and the public relations problem posed, or at least the problem the White House thought would be presented, within newly independent Africa, the United Nations, among American Negro groups and with liberal organizations in the United States generally.

A face to face meeting of President Johnson and Prime Minister Verwoerd would, in itself, constitute a highly significant political development in U.S.-South African relations. Although there is slightly more chance that it might take place than in the Kennedy Administration—when Attorney General Kennedy was particularly open to underground leaders from southern Africa including Pan

Africanist Patrick Duncan—it remains highly unlikely in the initial mood of the Johnson administration.

A more likely or at least possible meeting would be one carried on by a high level Presidential envoy such as Dean Acheson or Averell Harriman with Dr. Verwoerd and cabinet ministers in Pretoria. This would almost certainly become public knowledge. A third alternative, if there were discussions above the ambassadorial level, would be the meeting of such an emissary with the South African foreign minister in, say, London. Such a meeting can take place *en passant* and confidentially.

What role is played by the man behind the previously mentioned anti-American *South African Observer*—with few copies, and many given away, plus being sold in railway bookstalls—is not certain. Some Cabinet Ministers are afraid of the paper, and how it is always gunning for the “liberals” in the party. Indeed, when *Dagbreek* editor, Dirk Richards, complained to his Board Chairman, the Prime Minister, that Editor S. E. D. Brown was sniping too hard at the Johannesburg Sunday paper, and please couldn't the P.M. call off the dogs, the Prime Minister replied negatively and said, “Remember, I was an extremist once myself,” a remark which leads to a wealth of speculation.

On this subject, there is no gainsaying the truth of the anti-Semitic views of many Cabinet Ministers in the 1930's. These are much tempered on both sides, as when Finance Minister Dönges was invited to open the great new Synagogue in Johannesburg. In the 1963-64 parliamentary session, there was a mild recurrence of anti-Semitism, stimu-

lated in part by Israel's anti-South Africa vote in the U.N. and by the fact that Rivonia ringleaders, Goldreich and Wolpe, were Jewish. This antagonism was rectified when an Israeli minister came to Africa to apologize and explain the pressures. After a taunt to Alec Gorshel from the Nationalist backbench to "go back to Israel," Dr. Verwoerd got up at a secret Nationalist caucus and laid down the law that no more remarks of that nature could be tolerated.

From time to time, the Prime Minister informally hears reports on America from old South African friends out of the government. For example, when the head of an Afrikaans University, who had toured the States, was invited with his wife for a tete-a-tete on the occasion of the Prime Minister's birthday, the conversation centered on the academician's perceptive observations. Another old friend of the P.M.'s, who is now a prominent *predikant* (minister of religion), expressed his reactions to an American tour while they were fishing. Both of these trusted friends expressed balanced views—neither going overboard with enthusiasm nor being anti-American and ignoring the constructive view.

Policy Trends

We are not essaying an analysis of South African foreign policy. However, comments on its formation do perhaps explain why it is, first, based upon what its makers feel is long run principle, and, second, why it contains such a strong *ad hoc* element.

In addition to the traditional South African attitude of leaving foreign affairs to Great Britain, the National Party

had its eyes firmly fixed upon the domestic scene when it came to power in 1948. In attempting to solve the internal racial problem of the Republic, Prime Minister Verwoerd is attacking his principal and indeed virtually his only problem in foreign relations.

Reversed, Dr. Verwoerd feels his greatest need in solving the internal problem is to secure sufficient time on the international scene to bring a drastic reorganization of the traditional white master and black servant relationships.

The relative isolation of South Africa in the 1960's (not a necessarily growing isolation, since tides of contact flow and ebb) paralleled the greater concentration of the Prime Minister upon Foreign Affairs. Yet, paradoxically, Dr. D. F. Malan, speaking to South Africa as both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs on the day his party came to power on June 4, 1948, emphasized, "we unreservedly recognize our membership in the community of nations. We do not, therefore, in anyway subscribe to a policy of isolation." A year later (April 8, 1949), Dr. Malan reiterated, "it is clear, therefore, that we are not in favour of isolation. That is the last thing we want. Our diplomatic service has been considerably extended; and as diplomatic relations are usually based on a principle of reciprocity, the diplomatic representation of other nations has been correspondingly extended here in South Africa. Moreover, during the past year since the present government came to office, an important change has been made in that we are no longer satisfied to be represented in certain foreign countries by Ministers, but have decided that the time has come

for us to be represented in certain cases by Ambassadors."

Yet, despite these and other statements by both Dr. Malan and Minister Louw, the South African government concentrated upon internal affairs in both the Malan and Strijdom administrations. Again, one recalls talks with Dr. Malan after his retirement to his modest home in Stellenbosch. Although shrewd in his comments on many aspects of world affairs, particularly in inter-Commonwealth matters which he knew so well, the former Prime Minister did surprise me with his limited and hazy comprehension of the geography, and contemporary events, throughout much of black Africa. His anticipation of a complete collapse of such new states as Ghana was as far from reality then as now, despite the non-democratic inroads there.

Mr. Strijdom was less world-oriented than Dr. Malan, and relied very heavily upon the professional competence and foreign policy thinking of his new Minister, Eric Louw. It is true that Mr. Louw did initiate efforts towards a new South African foreign policy, discussing some possibilities during a luncheon with Dr. Nkrumah. In late 1964, when there was much internal praise for vigorous efforts to have more contact with emergent Africa, Mr. Louw spoke up rather plaintively from his retirement to say that this was nothing new in South African policy. But on balance, the Strijdom regime was one in which South West Africa, the Protectorates, the strength of the armed forces, and foreign affairs generally were let slide. Mr. Strijdom's emphasis upon "*baasskap*," despite the new developments gestating in the Ministry of Bantu Affairs during his regime, led,

in the words of a prominent Nationalist editor in the Transvaal, "to a static period of wasted opportunities."

The shift to Prime Minister Verwoerd eventually brought a far more realistic appraisal of the foreign scene, and, in time, a greater concentration upon foreign affairs. Dr. Verwoerd introduced a new candor in his speech on September 3, 1963, when he said: "When we look at the world around us, we find practically all nations condemning our policy. We find that organizations such as the United Nations condemn us—often in drastic terms. On the other hand, when trade is under consideration, there is greater appreciation of South Africa's value among countries, which are sometimes our severest critics, as well as in the world in general. They do realize that South Africa is NOT a danger to world peace; they realize also that South Africa provides and aims at providing increasingly better services for its non-Whites, services unequalled by any other nation. In commercial relationships these countries act on the basis of this knowledge rather than in accordance with the verbal attacks upon us. They expect South Africans to be 'mature and sensible enough' not to feel too hurt and not to be goaded into 'irresponsible action' by the language hurled at us under the cloak of friendship."

As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has often pointed out in American presidential affairs, the Wilsons, Roosevelts, Trumans, and Kennedys began their terms with an emphasis upon domestic matters and gradually moved to a concentration upon foreign policy. Dr. Verwoerd's natural preoccupation as Minister of Bantu Affairs with the central problem of

South Africa carried over into his first parliamentary sessions as Prime Minister.

The first really concentrated effort to apply South Africa's best brains (Smuts was a brilliant individual exception) to foreign affairs came about in 1959 over the problem of South West Africa. Despite some demurrers from Foreign Minister Louw, the Prime Minister began to gather around him some of the outstanding legal talent mentioned previously. The sorry spectacle of U.N. Committee Chairman Carpio's visit to South West Africa did have the result of focusing Dr. Verwoerd's attention on that territory. The real progress made earlier by Dag Hammarskjöld and the Prime Minister had started the process. When some very genuine deficiencies in South West were exposed to the Prime Minister, he proceeded posthaste with the Odendaal Report. Characteristically, its strength lies on the economic side where van Eck had a major voice in the development, ensuring first class plans. The world reaction to the political proposals was far less favorable than the South Africans had hoped.

The second area of consistent policy making has been over the High Commission territories. In a long series of speeches and asides, the Prime Minister dismissed the traditional and now unacceptable South African claims to Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland, and encouraged a type of Good Neighbor Policy. One speech happened to catch on with the press, and was originally misinterpreted overseas, as a "bid to take over." Again, the foreign reaction had not been well calculated. Since then, Dr. Verwoerd

has made substantial progress in quieting fears about invasion. In Bechuanaland and Basutoland, various politicians have spoken strongly on the need for close cooperation with the Republic. In Swaziland, the traditionalist government has been even more sympathetic to the Prime Minister's thinking.

Outside of South West and the Protectorates, there are no clear lines of policy which differ from past policies. A plan for cautious friendship with some of the new African states was encouraged by former Ambassador Brand Fourie when he capitalized on his United Nations contacts in his role as head of African Section in the Foreign Office. It is the intention of Foreign Minister Muller to carry this much further and to give it substance as fast as circumstances allow.

A Basuto attaché to the British Embassy is likely in 1965. Transkei diplomats are expected in due course, as well as official representatives of African states to the north. Despite much hard work and genuine progress, the complications are still great. This is evident when one examines the effort required today for distinguished short-term dark-skinned visitors to the Republic. Nigerian Godfrey Amachee of the United Nations and various American Negroes have had good visits, but only at the cost of much nervousness and extra work. But it can be done. In 1964, a distinguished American university president, who, with his wife, is of African descent, spent a month in the Republic without incident in luxury hotels, dining rooms, airplanes, taxicabs, or in the homes of private people from all ethnic and political groups. On at least one occasion, in the dining room of

Cape Town's leading hotel, both government officials and a highly respected leader in the local Coloured community were among the convivial guests. Japanese delegations have become so common in many leading South African hotels as to almost pass unnoticed.

It is very difficult for the South African government to ensure that a dark-skinned ambassador stationed permanently in South Africa would not encounter racial discrimination. The United States has had a dozen serious incidents and many minor ones with African diplomats. The formula worked out by Prime Minister Verwoerd in April, 1964, is that African states could send cabinet ministers or senior diplomats to Pretoria on short visits, and South Africa could do the same.

This worked out well in August 1961 with the visits of the "Katanga" Ministers, Gabriel Kitenge (Public Works) and Jean Kitwe (Finance), to Pretoria. In 1962, Minister Masamba-Debat (now Prime Minister) of Congo (Brazza) spent several days touring Johannesburg with a white Frenchman as his aide-de-camp. In each major city, the best hotel has become accustomed to the visits of distinguished "non-white" visitors. The amount of cordial cocktail and dinner parties which take place would be, frankly, as much of a surprise to the South African public, as the truth would be to many readers in African capitals, not to mention outside the continent.

For permanent residents the problem is more complex. Schooling would involve major shifts in domestic practices.

Cinemas and transport would also be a problem, as in parts of the U.S. However, the wife of a current English-speaking ambassador in South Africa is Ceylonese, and no lack of official or personal courtesy has reached the surface. In fact, few South Africans know about it and those officials who do, make no issue of it.

Most foreign policy continues on the *ad hoc* basis responding to particular challenges. Formal diplomatic correctness is one guideline. The Prime Minister has been resolutely opposed to interfering in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia, even more so to Prime Minister Ian Smith than to the more congenial Sir Roy Welensky. Relations with the Portuguese have been equally correct, although the military planning ties have been somewhat closer. South Africa and Greece have had close ties—General Smuts' wartime concern for the Royal family was a factor—but in 1954, South Africa voted in the U.N. against interference in Cyprus' domestic affairs, and incurred Greek displeasure.

Few assertions could be wilder than the one often hurled by some members of the Afro-Asian bloc that South Africa plans aggression against the newly-independent African states and is thus a threat to world peace. Such a course is recognized as fatal. The immorality of it would have tremendous repercussions within the National Party and in South Africa generally. Not only has South Africa not been Machiavellian in its foreign policy, it has been so formally correct and gentlemanly in the methods it employs abroad, as to fail to match the efforts of its opponents.

To return to the Prime Minister, it is likely that he will give increasing attention to foreign affairs. Some major shifts in practice and objectives may yet come. Power in South Africa is so concentrated—as a function of charisma and leadership not of *Diktat*—in Prime Minister Verwoerd, that no part of the official machinery changes radically without his stimulus. Similarly, when he takes hold of a problem, sweeping changes often follow. For example, only a leader as internally strong among the electorate as Dr. Verwoerd might take the bold gamble of giving away part of South Africa to an African state. Yet this is possible not only as part of a trade, as with Swaziland, but unilaterally. The Sesuto-speaking Witzieshoek valley adjoining Basutoland should, by the Prime Minister's general logic, belong to the Basutos who covet it. It is not impossible that this or something equally dramatic will form part of South Africa's bid for friendship with the Basuto.

As a conditioning for the acceptance of black diplomats, Dr. Piet Koornhof, a new National Party M.P. closely associated with the Prime Minister, told a convention of Afrikaner students that they were much closer to Transkei Prime Minister Matanzima (a black man) than they were to bomb-throwing revolutionaries in Johannesburg (white men). This radical concept, with broad connotations of accepting a black friend before a white enemy, was not reported by the Johannesburg press. The liberal *Rand Daily Mail* would have spoiled its account of the speaker as the epitome of a right wing racialist, while it was too much of a shock for the Afrikaans press.

Conclusions

These notes have suggested that while the way South African foreign policy is made is significantly different from the way it is developed in the United States, the difference has advantages and disadvantages for those who seek a *modus vivendi* between the countries.

On the one hand, South African policy is highly concentrated in the hands of a few people, hounded by many pressures, and with limited time to explore situations thoroughly. On the other hand, these are mostly highly intelligent individuals who are neither subject to great public emotion, nor to the tendency in the West to try to decide delicate issues by sheer volume of mass shouting. Of course, South African leaders are subject to strong democratic pressures from their electorate when it comes to war or peace, or to very broad decisions. But their hands are free to mould a principled and consistent policy without petty interruptions. Party discipline is also useful for this purpose. When some ill-informed and unwise men in Pretoria wished to raise a fund to support the British Fascists who attacked Kenya Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, this move was immediately squelched inside Afrikaner circles. To be sure, the sponsors would never have gained more than a crackpot support, but even this might have been misinterpreted wrongly abroad.

But while foreign policy can be decided *in camera* rather than in the press, this applies only so far as the external aspects are concerned. When it comes to internal matters,

politics surpass rugby as South Africa's number one sport. The white electorate is highly political. This is why, as we have suggested, the Prime Minister spends so much time on party politics. Thus the unfortunate impression that the British and American *demarches* on the Odendaal Report forced the Prime Minister to back down, had deep party reverberations.

Finally, we must mention the national style of government. South Africa has been cast into an old-world diplomatic pattern by the leadership of Eric Louw, reinforced by the Prime Minister's sense of what is proper. As Mr. Louw saw it, the world of diplomats is for gentlemen and formal documents; not the breezy modern diplomat whose relations with the people of a country take on a politician's sheen. The press, radio, and especially television, are not the main weapons of South African diplomats. In fact, South Africa feels itself to have been double-crossed so often by television teams that even the B.B.C. can no longer secure a straightforward interview.

Another facet of national style to be reemphasized involves pressure groups. The South African government has traditionally been opposed to pressure groups and resistant to them. Prime Minister Verwoerd has a particular anathema to organized pressure. Of course, he will not dismiss an Afrikaner farming delegation from the *platteland* out of hand, but attempts to organize opinion to force his hand carry a high boomerang quotient. The American "national style" is different. It is considered not only right but quite the normal procedure to build up as many pressure groups

as possible and to have them bear down on the White House, with the rationalization that if the decision is a component of the pressure groups, then this is an extra-parliamentary form of democracy.

Thus it is natural for the United States and organizations within its ambit to assume that South Africa realizes pressure-building is all part of political life. In fact, because pressuring is not part of the national style, efforts in this direction not only encounter a far stiffer resistance than they would in the United States or most countries, but are also viewed as being unethical, underhanded, and even contemptible. Thus it is that numerous efforts from the West to engage South Africa or South Africans in genuine and open consultation and discussion are received as efforts to pressure, undermine, and encircle. This is often reinforced in Afrikaner and also "English" minds when, as has happened with UN groups as well as private undertakings, the group seeking discussion with South Africa has, in the end, confessed that it didn't really want a two-way discussion but merely a capitulation.

There is some truth in the suggestion that South African foreign policy is made with the goal of achieving internal unity, first among the whites, secondly among the non-Bantu, and finally among all who make their home in the Republic. Many nations, including the United States at various periods, have made foreign policy primarily to achieve an internal domestic objective. Whether South Africa can afford this luxury is a moot point.

This brief essay raises as many questions about the vari-

ous forces in shaping South African foreign policy as it may have succeeded in answering. The American ability to understand South Africans of all sections, but particularly the Afrikaans-speaking people, as well as the equally important and neglected need for Afrikaners to truly understand America, is critical to the issue of relative war or relative peace between the two countries. "Understanding" is not used as a euphemism for necessarily sympathizing or for agreement. It is used in the sense of being a basic building block for better relations—whether they are now good or bad, and whether or not they get better or worse. There are conflicts which are unavoidable. But these are few. Most conflicts on issues which lead to loss of human life are avoidable in whole or at least may be minimized.

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